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Review Essay 
The Limits of Their World 
The Limits of International Law. By Jack L. Goldsmith and 
Eric A. Posner, Oxford University Press, 2005.  
Reviewed by Robert Hockett† 
 “[W]e, like our ancestors, can only press against the reced-
ing wall which hides the future.”1 
 
 “Draw us from base content and set our eyes on far-off 
goals.”2 
 
 “The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.”3 
Ours are brisk times for those lawyers whose studies and 
practices lead beyond national boundaries. For the agents who 
interest us growingly act across boundaries—as do acts’ conse-
quences and the values they implicate. The law, for its part, 
has sought to keep pace: the norms that emerge from states’ 
treaties and practices growingly speak not just to—or for—
states, but to and for persons as well.4 And the content of norms 
 
†  Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. Thanks to Jack Bar-
celó, Jim Chen, Doug Kysar, Joel Trachtman, and David Wippman for very 
helpful comment, discussion, and encouragement. Thanks to Keren Naveh and 
Vysali Sundararajan for first-rate research assistance. 
 1. BRIAN URQUHART, HAMMARSKJÖLD 46 (1994) (quoting Dag Ham-
marskjöld, address at the dedicatory celebration marking completion of the 
new buildings of the University of Chicago Law School (May 1, 1960)). 
 2. MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT 
AND THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 202 (2001) (quoting El-
eanor Roosevelt, from what her son reports to have been her nightly prayer). 
 3. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 149 
(C.K. Ogden trans., Routledge & Keegan Paul, 8th Impression 1960) (with 
posthumous contingent apologies to the author, who might have disavowed of 
this employment of his often quoted 5.6).  
 4. See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE EMPOWERED SELF: LAW AND 
HOCKETT_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:32:45 AM 
2006] THE LIMITS OF THEIR WORLD 1721 
 
both accordingly and increasingly is recognized to proceed, not 
just from the dickerings of diplomats professing to speak for 
their strategy-spurred states, but from a ripening sense of 
world decency and respect for human persons—as well as from 
the joint deliberations of executive officials, judges, regulators, 
academics, cause-advocates, and private practitioners, who 
speak to a welter of cross-cutting, widely shared, only some-
times pecuniary concerns.5 
Our times are heady as well for all those who would seek to 
explain the behavior of agents—be they individual or collective 
agents—as unmediated outgrowths of axiomatizable rational 
choice models or strategic “games.” For such models and games, 
to be rendered informative, not trivial, require that definite, 
corroborable ascriptions be made—not in respect just of agen-
tial preferences, but of preference-formation and real thought 
processes too.6 And the more that we learn empirically about 
 
SOCIETY IN THE AGE OF INDIVIDUALISM (1999) (discussing how individualism 
has emerged as an increasingly preferred alternative to nationally imposed 
identity). Consider also the mandate of the proposed new International Crimi-
nal Court, as well as that of the Yugoslavian War Crimes Tribunal. Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 999; 
Statute of the International Tribunal, May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192. Compare 
these observations to that made by our authors: that states will play the “star-
ring role” in their exposition because NAFTA spoke not to President Clinton, 
but to the United States. JACK GOLDSMITH & ERIC POSNER, THE LIMITS OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW 4–5 (2005). 
 5. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (pos-
iting that governments are increasingly working through transnational global 
networks); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: 
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 1 (2002) (discussing the future of international cooperation in the con-
text of transgovernmental networks). This turn appears canonically to have 
begun with ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVER-
EIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995) 
(advocating a managerial approach to international dispute resolution through 
global transgovernmental networks), though it is anticipated by the approach 
to international law associated with the New Haven school, further mentioned 
infra note 129 and accompanying text. Both go quite unnoticed in The Limits. 
See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4. 
 6. See, e.g., DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF RA-
TIONAL CHOICE THEORY: A CRITIQUE OF APPLICATIONS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 
(1994) (providing a comprehensive critique of rational choice theory); THE RA-
TIONAL CHOICE CONTROVERSY: ECONOMIC MODELS OF POLITICS RECONSID-
ERED (Jeffrey Friedman ed., rev. paperbound ed., Yale University Press 1996) 
(1995) (collecting essays from rational choice theorists responding to Donald P. 
Green and Ian Shapiro’s critique); see also GARY S. BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR 
TASTES (1996); CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky, eds., 2000); JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS: STUDIES IN THE 
LIMITATION OF RATIONALITY (1989); ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT 
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these matters, the more that we come to appreciate them as 
bounded, embedded, and endogenous to norm-generative life in 
communion with others.7  
It therefore might not have been thought that a new book 
presented as a general account of international law, written by 
two distinguished scholars of the field, could proceed as if the 
past several decades’ developments just had not occurred. Yet 
that is in essence what we are confronted with in Jack Gold-
smith and Eric Posner’s new, The Limits of International Law 
(The Limits)—a world of fetishized, black-boxy Scrooge-states, 
incomprehensibly seeking in large part to eat one another, cal-
culating and gaming with those and with cognate objectives in 
view, constrained by no more than the weapons that others pos-
sess all while “empt[il]y, happ[il]y,”8 or mendaciously speaking 
as if the routines and mere memoranda of understanding that 
emerge from this contest were law. 
I of course caricature slightly, but only slightly, we’ll see—
and certainly less, I believe, than do Goldsmith and Posner the 
world and its order. And their caricature proves more than in-
accurate—it is potentially paralyzing. For its stories, were they 
to mislead, say, persons in high places who lacked in our au-
thors’ own gifts or integrity, could work as dark augurs—self-
verifying prophecies-backward, as it were—dragging us hind-
ways straight back to the dreary and inhumane tar pits we 
thought we had left. They would be, that is to say, altogether 
needlessly, tragically, and self-fulfillingly limiting. 
Happily, however, in one sense the book moves from dark-
ness toward light: each of its succeeding chapters occasions 
more hope, in our grappling with it, than its predecessor. In 
what follows, therefore, since I—just like Goldsmith and Posner 
at bottom, I think—am an optimist, I shall by and large follow 
 
POND: HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE QUEST FOR STATUS (1985); JUDGMENT UN-
DER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahnemann et al., eds., 
1982); JAMES G. MARCH, A PRIMER ON DECISION MAKING: HOW DECISIONS 
HAPPEN (1994); ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, MODELING BOUNDED RATIONALITY (1998); 
HERBERT SIMON, MODELS OF MAN (1957). It is remarkable that, as in the case 
of the New Haven and “disaggregated state” schools, none of this extensive 
and widely discussed literature is so much as noted in The Limits. 
 7. There is much too much here to cite exhaustively. By way of a truly 
minimal sampling, see BECKER, supra note 6; CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES, 
supra note 6; ELSTER, supra note 6; FRANK, supra note 6; JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY, supra note 6; MARCH, supra note 6; RUBINSTEIN, supra note 6; 
SIMON, supra note 6. Again, no notice of these developments is found in The 
Limits. 
 8. See infra note 267 and accompanying text. 
HOCKETT_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:32:45 AM 
2006] THE LIMITS OF THEIR WORLD 1723 
 
our authors’ own order. Part I provides a few brief methodologi-
cal preliminaries—matters regrettably never directly addressed 
by our authors—which serve as the critical backdrop to our 
foreground critique. Part II turns to schematizing the authors’ 
“core theory,” following their own proffered roadmap. It chari-
tably interprets what I take Goldsmith and Posner to believe 
themselves to be doing, while highlighting the principal concep-
tual, methodological, and empirical concerns occasioned by that 
preview along the way. 
Part III shifts to the authors’ own efforts at further elabo-
rating and “applying” their theory. We find here confirmed all 
the fears that the preview brought forward. Hence, we are 
brought to consider more fully some truly surprising lacunae 
and muddles: the authors’ never-justified attachment to bilat-
erality and static analysis, their consequent empirical sterility 
and confused norm-reductivity, and ultimately, therefore, an 
altogether hapless, hopeless, ethical repugnance.  
Part IV then turns to our authors’ attempts at addressing 
critiques of their story. These amount in the end, quite ironi-
cally, to implicit endorsements of that principal complaint 
which the authors do not ever forthrightly discuss—or even, it 
seems, so much as anticipate: that while futilely guised as de-
scriptive, their story defaults to legitimative, thus covertly and 
insidiously to prescriptive. This Part accordingly also affords 
opportunity to consider the glimmers of promise that engage-
ment with the book can provide, and how all of us both might, 
and indeed ought, to widen and redeem them. Wittingly or oth-
erwise, Goldsmith and Posner afford us occasion to ponder 
more fully what a just, decent world order will look like—and 
how we might now both augment and accelerate our movement, 
already well underway, toward consummation. On that note of 
hope, I conclude. 
I.  METHODOLOGICAL PRELIMINARIES 
A few preliminaries here will prove helpful in what follows. 
Goldsmith and Posner proffer what they call a “theory” of in-
ternational law, one they report will in some (not quite speci-
fied) sense outperform what they label “the traditional” ac-
count. But they say nothing directly about what they think to 
constitute or to be the purpose of a theory. Nor do they address 
what they think to be required of a satisfactory theory, or to be 
appropriate criteria by which to cross-compare competing theo-
ries. I shall therefore have at some points to impute positions 
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on these matters—metatheoretic positions—to the authors in 
my efforts to interpret their intentions and claims. 
The metatheoretic positions that I shall attribute to Gold-
smith and Posner are guided by two interpretive norms. The 
first I shall call, familiarly, a “principle of charity.” When in 
doubt, I attribute to Goldsmith and Posner what I take to be 
the best, most compelling understandings of theoretic adequacy 
and appropriate cross-comparison as consistent with the second 
interpretive norm. 
The second interpretive norm might be labeled “textual an-
swerability.” The metatheoretic positions that I attribute to 
Goldsmith and Posner ideally will cohere harmoniously with, or 
at any rate not stand in significant tension with, specific state-
ments that the authors actually make.9 
What one takes to be the best understandings of theoretic 
adequacy and appropriate cross-comparison, unsurprisingly, 
will ride upon an understanding of what “theories” are. A the-
ory, I take it, is an effort to order and simplify—while not 
“oversimplifying”—hence to explain, in some causal fashion, 
what might in the absence of the theory confront us as a disor-
dered array of phenomena. Simplicity, in turn, pertains to the 
number of independent—or free, or exogenous—variables that 
one employs in causally accounting for a given dependent—or 
bound, or endogenous—variable. A theory that causally ac-
counts for the same events as another while positing fewer 
causal elements is simpler, more elegant or parsimonious than 
the other, and typically thought better on that account.10 
“Oversimplifying” is the act of stripping down the number 
of free variables to such degree as begins objectionably to 
weaken the theory along one or more of the other dimensions of 
theory assessment. An oversimplifying theory often is said to be 
objectionably “reductive,” having implausibly purported to ex-
plain away some erstwhile free variables on the proffered 
ground that they are extensionally equivalent to, or themselves 
causally explicable by, others. 
I take it that to “explain” or “account for” some empirical 
 
 9. The two interpretive norms—charity and textual answerability—
obviously could come into conflict were one seeking to make sense of someone 
who was hopelessly incoherent. Happily, we do not encounter that problem 
here. 
 10. The best known champion of elegance of this sort probably is Willard 
Van Orman Quine. See, e.g., WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 
19–21 (1960). 
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(purportedly dependent, endogenous) phenomenon is in part to 
point to some other empirical (for purposes of the theory, inde-
pendent or exogenous) phenomenon that temporally precedes 
it, and, ideally, rests in some intuitively graspable, structurally 
characterizable causal nexus with it. We seek, in accounting for 
data, both (a) a statistical correlation and (b) ideally, some in-
tuitively appreciable, mechanico-causal “story” that accounts 
for the correlation itself, rendering the latter more than merely 
statistically significant. 
Our expectations regarding a suitable causal nexus or 
story, in turn, generally appear to be such as to prefer that the 
causal relation be describable at the most micro or foundational 
“level” accessible to us in view of the current state of the em-
pirical sciences. What used to pass for a causal relation in biol-
ogy, for example, might now have to be further elaborated if we 
seek to plumb more deeply to the level of biochemistry, and fur-
ther still if we would reach down to biophysics, and so on. The 
demand for more fundamental levels of causal accounting, 
hence for a fuller causal story, often is couched as a demand for 
more “fine-grained” or “nuanced” analysis.11 
The idea that a particular macro-correlation might be 
thought unnecessarily clumsy or coarse-grained draws atten-
tion to—though it is analytically distinct from—another attrib-
ute, hinted at already, that we demand of satisfactory empirical 
explanations or accounts: this is the demand that they explain 
or account for as many instances of the phenomenon to be ex-
plained—the dependent or endogenous variable—as possible, 
ideally for all of them. If every pandemic followed upon the ap-
pearance of sunspots and no appearance of sunspots failed to be 
quickly followed by a pandemic, we might come to hold a “sun-
spot theory of pandemics.” Whereas if the correlations were sta-
tistically significant but nonetheless prone to exception, we 
would seek a more fine-grained account operating at a more 
physically fundamental level of analysis to explain instances 
both of correlation and of correlational failure. We would seek 
“intervening causes.” So demands for micro-correlational nu-
ance and for maximal empirical corroborability often go hand in 
hand. 
Nonetheless, they are conceptually distinct demands, as is 
revealed by the recognition that we would likely, today, seek in-
 
 11. See, e.g., R. HARRÉ, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LOGIC OF THE SCIENCES 
(1960); W.H. NEWTON-SMITH, THE RATIONALITY OF SCIENCE (1981). 
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tervening causes between sunspots and pandemics even in the 
presence of perfect correlability. We want the aforementioned 
story for intuition-grounded reasons independent of statistics-
grounded reasons. We want posited mechanical relations or cor-
relations to cohere with our general understandings of “the way 
things work.” And those general understandings are the prod-
uct both of our direct experiences and of our knowledge of the 
sundry scientific disciplines at their current stages of develop-
ment. 
One corollary of the foregoing desiderata, of course, is that 
a theory be empirically testable at all. For the theory purports 
to account for some observed phenomenon, by treating it as sig-
nificantly correlated with, and causally generated by, some 
other phenomenon. And that accounting accordingly generates 
predictions that can be corroborated or falsified—expectations 
to the effect that, where the purported cause is found, the puta-
tive effect typically will follow. A theory that can under no con-
ceivable circumstances be corroborated is self-refuting, incon-
sistent, or incoherent, and so cannot satisfactorily account for 
or explain anything at all. And a theory that can under no con-
ceivable circumstances be shown false is trivial, tautologous, or 
uninformative; it does not generate any empirical expectations 
at all. Such a theory says nothing about the world, and so does 
not explain or account for any feature of the world.12 
The three desirable attributes of theories—that they caus-
ally account, as simply and mechanico-intuitively as possible, 
for as many instances of the phenomenon to be explained as 
possible—are also the three attributes by reference to which 
theories are evaluatively cross-compared. A theory that scores 
better than another along one of those metrics will, other 
things being equal, typically be thought superior to the other. 
The possibility that other things might not always be equal, 
however, highlights a potential indexing problem: how to weigh 
 
 12. That is not to say that such a theory need be without value. A tauto-
logical theory might reveal something about the interrelations of essential 
concepts that we employ, hence something about the structure of our thoughts 
or even, therefore, of some set of concept-contoured things that we think 
about. A useful case in point is Walrasian general equilibrium theory. While it 
is empirically trivial in the sense that it generates conclusions that scarcely 
could fail to follow on its premises, nonetheless it is valuable in showing what 
we commit ourselves to in accepting those premises. I do not, incidentally, 
wish to be taken for suggesting that the distinction between informative and 
tautological theories or claims is hard and fast; for our purposes, consider 
these “ideal types.” 
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comparatively—how to commensurate—differing scores along 
these distinct dimensions when one theory scores better than 
another on one, and worse than that other on another. I do not 
have any commensurating algorithm to offer, though were push 
to come to shove, empirical corroboration probably would “out-
weigh” elegance and intuitive appreciability. As it happens, 
however, push seldom does come to shove; it is rare for theories 
to score much more highly than others along one dimension 
while scoring much less highly than those others along other 
dimensions.13 And for our present purposes in particular, we 
shall see that we face no indexing problem at all. For it turns 
out that those theorists of international law whom Goldsmith 
and Posner label “traditionalists” strictly dominate our authors; 
they “win” on all counts. 
Two final methodological observations will prove helpful. 
The first has to do with the earlier-mentioned possibility of hy-
per-reductivity in some theories’ putative simplifications. The 
best authorities hold that the human or moral sciences, which 
make indispensable use of such phenomena as self-
consciousness, self-understanding, and meaning-ascription as 
explanatory variables, are not ultimately reducible to “harder” 
sciences that do not accommodate such concepts.14 If those au-
thorities are correct, then an account of “behaviors associated 
with international law,” such as Goldsmith and Posner purport 
to provide,15 will warrant skepticism insofar as it purports to 
explain such behavior without reference to the meanings that 
agents themselves attribute to their actions. Such explanations 
will have either to posit occult processes that “really” are 
prompting the agents’ actions even as those agents (self-
deludingly) think otherwise, or to attribute dishonesty to the 
agents—an attribution which, violating as it does the principle 
of charity that I employ in interpreting Goldsmith and Posner’s 
 
 13. See, e.g., Willard Van Orman Quine, On Simple Theories of a Complex 
World, 15 SYNTHESE 103 (1963) (discussing the preference for simplicity in 
theories). 
 14. See, e.g., DAVID J. CHALMERS, THE CONSCIOUS MIND: IN SEARCH OF A 
FUNDAMENTAL THEORY 93–122 (1996); HILARY PUTNAM, MEANING AND THE 
MORAL SCIENCES 83–94 (1978); JOHN R. SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY 
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND 262–72 (1983); PETER WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SO-
CIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO PHILOSOPHY 66–94 (6th Impression 1970) 
(1958); Donald Davidson, Mental Events, in EXPERIENCE AND THEORY 79, pas-
sim (Lawrence Foster & J.W. Swanson eds., 1970); Donald Davidson, Thinking 
Causes, in MENTAL CAUSATION 1, 3–12 (John Heil & Alfred Mele eds., 1993). 
 15. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 13. 
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claims themselves, probably ought not to be made absent 
strong evidence that can independently ground it. 
My last methodological remark is that, whereas I have 
elaborated what I have said about metatheoretic desiderata 
principally by reference to positive empirical theories, theories 
also can be normative in character, purporting to bring ex-
planatory order to, say, some otherwise disorderly array of dis-
tinct moral judgments.16 And normative theories are subject to 
metatheoretic criteria just as are positive theories, though the 
specific criteria in the two cases might in some respects di-
verge.17 Because Goldsmith and Posner proffer what they take 
for a positive theory that they think superior to other positive 
theories, however, and because, pursuant to the earlier ad-
verted principle of charity, I wish to take them at their word, I 
shall find little in this review to say about normative theorizing 
apart from the following. 
While it has been something of a fashionable commonplace 
for over two centuries to distinguish strictly between positive 
and normative claims and accounts—to hold “is” radically dis-
tinct from “ought”18—the gulf between them is not always 
crisply demarcated or wide, at least not when that which is 
theorized either is, or is closely associated with, human behav-
ior itself (law-making and law-following in particular).19 And so 
even the act of putatively theorizing in positive fashion can 
bear consequences that admit of a normative evaluation,20 
which in turn can in some circumstances subject the theorizer 
to normative evaluation. Hence, if human behavior can itself be 
influenced by somebody’s putatively positive theorizing in such 
 
 16. This is of course part of the Rawlsian program in JOHN RAWLS, A THE-
ORY OF JUSTICE (1971). 
 17. See generally Robert Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution: A 
Meta-Theory of Justice, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1179 (2005) (considering what 
metatheoretic criteria should be employed in evaluating normative theories). 
 18. See DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 469 (L.A. Selby-
Bigge ed., 2d ed., Oxford University Press 1978) (1888). 
 19. E.g., JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBU-
TIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg 
trans., 1996); HILARY PUTNAM, THE COLLAPSE OF THE FACT/VALUE DICHOT-
OMY AND OTHER ESSAYS (2004); John R. Searle, Prima-facie Obligations, in 
PHILOSOPHICAL SUBJECTS: ESSAYS PRESENTED TO P.F. STRAWSON 238 (Zak 
Van Straaten ed., 1980). 
 20. For an interesting study, see Robert H. Frank et al., Does Studying 
Economics Inhibit Cooperation?, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 159 (1993) (examining 
whether economists’ exposure to the self-interest model encourages self-
interest behavior). 
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manner as to lead people to engage in activities that are mor-
ally wrong, the putatively positive theorist will potentially bear 
some responsibility for more wrongdoing’s having come to occur 
in the world. 
If the putatively positive theory the proffering of which is-
sues in such consequences is uniquely empirically robust, we 
might in the aforementioned case be presented with something 
like a “tragic” trade-off: “truth versus goodness,” or something 
like that. But the corrupting theory of course need not be em-
pirically robust, or might be otherwise inferior to an alternative 
positive theory that is not morally corrupting. This might be 
because the first theory accounts for fewer purportedly depend-
ent phenomena, or because that theory is hyper-reductive, or 
because it proffers as exogenous variables some pseudo-
phenomena that are so ill-individuated as not really to generate 
empirical predictions at all (rendering the theory nonsensical or 
trivial), or because, perhaps by dint of its falling prey to one or 
more of the just-listed weaknesses, it proves to be self-
fulfillingly prophetic. In such cases there is no trade-off at all. 
And so in such cases the theory and theorizer will be, very sim-
ply, answerable at the bar of moral accountability. 
II.  THE LIMITS IN BRIEF—IN AIM AND IN OUTLINE 
On with the accounting: Goldsmith and Posner will “seek 
to explain how international law works by integrating the 
study of international law with the realities of international 
politics.”21 To that end, their “theory gives pride of place to two 
elements of international politics usually neglected or dis-
counted by international law scholars: state power and state in-
terest.”22 So “power” and “interest,” apparently, will serve as 
independent variables here. And Goldsmith and Posner will 
employ “a methodological tool infrequently used in interna-
tional law scholarship, rational choice theory, to analyze these 
factors.”23 The latter comes as a curious announcement. One 
 
 21. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 3. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. Some international law scholars have made liberal, and typically 
more formally sophisticated, use of rational choice and game theoretic modes 
of analysis. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law 
in International Governance, 54 INT’L ORG. 421 (2000); Andrew T. Guzman, A 
Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002); 
George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law 
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might have thought, in view of the promise to explain “how in-
ternational law works,” that it would be the latter that would 
be “analyzed.” But we shall see that the real problem turns out 
to be that “power” and “interest” indeed should have been ana-
lyzed, in order to firm up our free variables and accordingly 
generate veritably corroborable or falsifiable empirical predic-
tions, and yet never are analyzed. 
Having named the purportedly free variables, Goldsmith 
and Posner turn to their story. “Put briefly,” their theory as-
serts “that international law emerges from states acting ra-
tionally to maximize their interests, given their perceptions of 
the interests of other states and the distribution of state 
power.”24 Goldsmith and Posner candidly admit that they “are 
not the first to invoke the idea of state interest to explain the 
rules of international law.”25 Nor, they might have added, are 
they the first to invoke the idea of power to explain the rules of 
international law. “But too often,” they lament, “this idea [of 
state interest] is invoked in a vague and conclusory fashion.”26 
That charge, which like most in the book does not find itself 
leveled at any named person or persons, of course sets a stan-
 
Game, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541 (2005); Edward T. Swaine, Rational Custom, 52 
DUKE L.J. 559 (2002); Pierre-Hugues Verdier, Cooperative States: Interna-
tional Relations, State Responsibility and the Problem of Custom, 42 VA. J. 
INT’L L. 839 (2002); Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, Customary Law and Articu-
lation Theories: An Economic Analysis, (George Mason Univ. Sch. of Law, Law 
& Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 02-24, 2002), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=335220. This is a minimal sampling. Were we to 
turn to the international relations and international regimes literatures, ex-
amples would proliferate in yet greater abundance. 
 24.  GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 3. An interest is not the sort of 
thing that one ordinarily thinks to be subject to cardinal or ordinal quantifica-
tion (compare “they maximize their trousers” and “she maximized her lawn-
mower”). Thus, I shall be taking Goldsmith and Posner to mean something 
like “maximize the degrees to which their interests or preferences are satis-
fied.” For the latter to make sense, we shall require some satisfactory specifi-
cation of states’ “satisfaction,” “utility,” or “welfare” functions. As a founda-
tional matter, that in turn will require, among other things, some means of 
commensurating satisfactions of distinct interests or preferences in cases 
where greater attainment of one such preference requires trading off some de-
gree of satisfaction of some other interest(s) or preference(s). And as both a 
foundational and an ethical matter, we shall want the state’s utility or welfare 
function to ride in some satisfactory way upon the utility or welfare of its citi-
zens. Difficulties for Goldsmith and Posner’s approach raised by the first men-
tioned requirement figure into much of the discussion in Part III. Difficulties 
raised by the second mentioned requirement figure into much of the discussion 
in Part IV. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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dard to which it will be fair to hold the authors themselves. 
Goldsmith and Posner next undertake to clarify some of 
the assumptions embedded in their account. One is “that the 
state is the relevant agent” in analyzing international law.27 
Another is “that a state has an identifiable interest, and that 
states act rationally to further these interests.”28 Now states’ 
interests, in turn, Goldsmith and Posner classify as states’ 
“preferences about outcomes.”29 The latter are “not always easy 
to determine,” we are (indeed understatedly) warned, since 
states “subsume[] many institutions and individuals that obvi-
ously do not share identical preferences about outcomes.”30 For 
that reason, the authors advise, “preferences of the state’s po-
litical leadership”—like those of the state, here somehow ap-
parently still aggregated—effectively will proxy for preferences 
of the state itself.31 Our authors will also “avoid strong assump-
tions about the content of state interests and assume that they 
can vary by context,”32 a tack which of course can prove helpful 
to the theory’s ready empirical corroborability, and should keep 
us mindful of our authors’ earlier recorded lament that too of-
ten the idea of state interest is invoked in a “vague and conclu-
sory fashion.”33 
States reduce to human persons, in Goldsmith and Pos-
ner’s world, in respect of more than just interests and prefer-
ences. States’ very existence rides upon citizen psychology,34 
 
 27. Id. at 4. 
 28. Id. (emphasis added). The inconsistency between singular “interest” 
and plural “interests” in the last two assumptions does not detain the authors, 
nor do the aggregation and indexing problems implicit in use of the singular in 
the second stated assumption. See supra note 24, on the significance of that 
lacuna. For more on the matter see also infra Part III. 
 29. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 6. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. (emphasis added). 
 33. Id. at 3. 
 34. Id. at 4. That is one piece of the well-known “declaratory” theory of 
state existence, individuation, and recognition, pursuant to which a state ob-
jectively exists once a defined “people” claim to have formed state institutions 
bearing effective jurisdiction over a defined territory and capable of fulfilling 
interstate obligations. The competing view is the “constitutive theory,” pursu-
ant to which states themselves are creatures of international legal recognition. 
See, e.g., LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: A POLICY-ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 39–49 (1989). A particularly 
interesting recent discussion in the constitutive spirit, which integrates state 
constitutivity with transnational normativity, is found in Ryan Goodman & 
Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 
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and states act only through their leaders.35 It might therefore 
have been insisted that a sufficiently fine-grained or nuanced 
theory of state action should be grounded in some satisfactory 
micro-foundational theory of individual choice. Yet our authors 
will nevertheless give states the “the starring role in [their] 
drama.”36 For “international law addresses itself to states and, 
for the most part, not to individuals or other entities.”37 It is far 
from clear, however, that international law’s formally address-
ing states rather than persons would warrant either an empiri-
cal explanation (which is what we are promised) or an ethical 
justification (which soon will be effectively promised)—as dis-
tinguished from a juridical description of state behavior un-
grounded in some account of the behavior of the persons 
through whom states act. And so Goldsmith and Posner slip 
rather too quickly here into an elision which, as we will see in 
Part III, ends up haunting their empirics, and, as we will see in 
Part IV, ends up haunting their ethics. 
Finally, our authors posit the usual “assumptions”—
stipulative definitions, really—associated with “rationality” as 
comprehended by rational choice theory (hereinafter “RCT”).38 
Rationality is familiarly conceived in “instrumental” terms, and 
rational choices generate “consistent, complete, and transitive” 
preference orderings.39 Goldsmith and Posner are clear about 
 
1749 (2003). 
 35. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 4, 6. 
 36. Id. at 4–5. 
 37. Id. at 5. “International law” does indeed denote lex inter nationes. In 
light of international law’s morphology throughout the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries into something increasingly more like lex inter na-
tiones et homines, many scholars and journals have, for over a decade, recom-
mended a terminological shift to some such label as “transnational law” rather 
than “international law.” 
 38. Id. at 7. 
 39. Id. Completeness also goes by the name of “categoricity” in the litera-
ture. For fuller elaboration of the more familiar RCT axioms, see KENNETH J. 
ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (1951); AMARTYA K. SEN, 
COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970). Fuller axiomatizations of 
RCT typically (1) insist, for the sake of parsimony, upon independence as be-
tween axioms, and (2) include (not always without controversy), an “expected 
utility” axiom, in order to accommodate uncertainty, risk preference and/or 
nonconstant marginal utility. See JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR MORGEN-
STERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 24–31, 76 (3d ed. 1953). 
It is also customary, though it proves problematic, to insist upon one or more 
forms of interpersonal utility-noncomparability, universal domain, independ-
ence of irrelevant alternatives, and weak or strong Paretianism in circum-
stances involving the choice and/or welfare of multiple persons, i.e., “social 
choice,” “bargaining,” or “game” situations. See ARROW, supra; NEUMANN & 
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not actually attributing satisfaction of the RCT axioms to “the 
decision-making process of a ‘state’ in all its complexity.”40 
Rather, they will employ RCT “pragmatically as a tool to organ-
ize [their] ideas and intuitions and to clarify assumptions.”41 
This, they argue, will lead in turn to “better and more nuanced 
explanations of state behavior related to international law than 
other theories do.”42 We will keep that promise in mind. 
With general aims and assumptions laid out, Goldsmith 
and Posner next provide a skeletal preview of their theory. 
“Consider,” they instruct us, “two states.”43 At any “time one” 
(t1), our “two states have certain capacities and interests.”44 
“[I]nterests are determined by leaders who take account in 
some way of the preferences of citizens and groups.”45 Capaci-
ties, presumably, carry forward the authors’ earlier promised 
attention to power.46 “[C]apacities include military forces, eco-
nomic institutions, natural resources, and human capital.”47 At 
t1, “the states divide available resources” (including, or included 
among, the aforementioned capacities?) “in some stable fash-
ion.”48 
Now at a subsequent “time two” (t2) the ubiquitous exoge-
nous “shock,”49 disturbs the t1 division of resources.50 One 
state’s “power” (stock of resources?) increases relative to the 
other’s.51 In consequence, “naturally,”52 the newly engrossed 
state demands that its just-increased share of world resources 
be augmented yet further53—simply because, evidently, in light 
of the boost to its share of world resources (hence “power”) in-
 
MORGENSTERN supra; SEN, supra; John F. Nash, Jr., The Bargaining Problem, 
18 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950). For reasons I explain in Part III, I think that 
“instrumental” prefixed to “rationality” is superfluous. 
 40. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 7. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 7–8. 
 43. Id. at 10. This attachment to bilaterality proves consistent and critical 
throughout The Limits. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. at 3. 
 47. Id. at 10. 
 48. Id. 
 49. This shock is familiar in particular to macroeconomists. 
 50. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 11. 
 51. Id. 
 52. These scare quotes are my own, and I use them because this word cap-
tures some peculiar assumptions embedded in the authors’ account. 
 53. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 11. 
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duced by the “shock,” it can. Now, we are told, if our two states 
“had perfect information about each other . . . and if transaction 
costs were zero, their relations would adjust smoothly and 
quickly to the shock, and at time three [(t3)] there would be a 
new division of resources.”54 
We might of course begin to wonder at this point what in-
tuitive grounding this picture affords us for any existence theo-
rem that might be derived for new equilibria in a formally more 
rigorous model than the one we are given. For new resources 
conferred by a shock presumably furnish capacity to demand 
yet more resources, then more, etc. ad plenum.55 We shall re-
turn to this matter later, confining ourselves for the present to 
our authors’ preliminary, schematic presentation of their the-
ory. 
Goldsmith and Posner suggest that the “behavioral regu-
larity” that is any new equilibrium division of resources will be 
attributable to either of four possible explanatory models.56 One 
model, labeled “coincidence of interest,” posits that “neither of 
the two states has an interest” in departing from the new equi-
librium, whatever action the other state might take.57 It would 
seem we might also characterize this prospect, given the au-
thors’ earlier apparent interpretation of “interest” as resource-
wanting, as a situation in which there remains nothing more in 
the world not held by a state which that state regards as a re-
source, nothing more for which the state has either use or de-
sire. If that follows, then it seems that state satiety is possible. 
And this is so notwithstanding the authors’ earlier apparent 
postulate that “shocks” taking the form of resource-
augmentation in one state immediately induce a desire in that 
state for more (of another state’s) resources.58 
The authors’ announcement that a coincidence of interest 
in respect of resource division might be possible, then, comes as 
something of a puzzle that we shall have to consider below. It 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Perhaps the authors will wish to postulate diminishing interest re-
turns to power/resource acquisition, or power returns to resource acquisition—
hence concavity and, ultimately, the prospect of a fixed point. Certainly they 
appear to be relying upon such a prospect. But of course, in view of power’s—
like interest’s—want of specification here, we are left but charitably to specu-
late. 
 56. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 11. 
 57. Id. at 11–12 (emphasis omitted). 
 58. But see supra note 55 and accompanying text (noting that the authors 
fail to clarify this point). 
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also calls to mind the authors’ earlier complaint about other 
(again unnamed) theorists’ explanations for international law 
compliance by reference to “preferences for complying.”59 For if 
a “successful theory of international law must show why states 
comply . . . rather than assuming that they have a preference 
for doing so,”60 then surely it will be fair to demand that a suc-
cessful theory of stable, resource-dividing equilibria likewise 
show why states remain in equilibrium rather than assuming 
that they bear a happily coincident lack of interest in upsetting 
it.61 
The authors’ second explanatory model for a given equilib-
rium, familiarly labeled “coordination,” resembles the first, 
save that each state now has regard for the possible actions of 
the other.62 The idea here is that it does not matter what par-
ticular division of relative state holdings occurs, so long as each 
state understands clearly that it is the present division.63 It is 
unclear what relevance coordination, as distinguished from co-
operation (more on which presently), has to resource-division 
scenarios, however. The paradigmatic cases of coordination 
found in the RTC and economics literatures typically involve 
flows of activity qua flows—traffic is the usual story—not 
scarce goods consumption.64 Thus it is not clear what explana-
tory value coordination has in accounting for a new equilibrium 
division of resources at t3. Again we leave further consideration 
to Part III, where we shall find that coordination indeed proves 
in large part superfluous. 
The “third possible explanation” for a new equilibrium di-
vision, the authors tell us, is the state of affairs in which each 
state would “benefit” by upsetting the existing equilibrium at t3 
by seizing more of the resources held by the other, but in view 
of the cost that the other state, if resisting seizure, could im-
 
 59. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 10. 
 60. Id. Nobody is named as assuming this, and we shall consider the pros-
pect of finding independently observable indicia of such preferences as simply 
correlatable explanatory variables. See infra Part III. 
 61. The usually effective international norm of respect for international 
boundaries and the respect for that norm among American officials and the 
American public might better account for the United States not having seized 
petroleum reserves from Canada and Mexico than does any lack of American 
interest in those resources. 
 62. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 12 (emphasis omitted). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See, e.g., THOMAS SCHELLING, MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 
67–68, 113–15, 119–24 (1978). 
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pose, the rational course of action is to refrain from attempting 
the seizure.65 The states accordingly refrain.66 That situation 
the authors label, tugging at the language a bit, “coopera-
tion.”67 It is cooperation with Marquis of Queensbury Rules. 
The “final” possible explanation for a given equilibrium, 
say Goldsmith and Posner, is “coercion.”68 One state “is satis-
fied with the existing” division, but the other state wishes to 
take from that first state’s allotment.69 “If [that second state] is 
sufficiently powerful, it can dictate the new” division.70 That 
would seem hard to dispute. “Power” in this scenario plays a 
role cognate with that of “interest” in the first scenario and 
“preferences for international law compliance” in the authors’ 
caricature of “traditional” international law scholarship. If a 
state really wishes to take in some sense and is sufficiently 
powerful in some sense, it surely can (and perhaps even will) 
take in some sense. 
It bears emphasis that these four scenarios all are pre-
sented as tools for explaining comparative statics, not dynam-
ics.71 The authors will employ them in attempts to explain equi-
libria and, presumably (though this is not stated) initial 
departures therefrom.72 They will not employ the models to de-
scribe the actual process of adjustment, post-shock, from one 
equilibrium to its successor.73 Presumably a dynamic model in 
 
 65. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 12. 
 66. Returning to the scenario contemplated supra note 61, perhaps Gold-
smith and Posner suppose that Canada and Mexico could impose costs that 
exceed those occasioned currently by lack of energy independence. 
 67. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 12 (emphasis omitted). 
 68. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  
 71. This weddedness to statics, like that to bilaterality noted supra note 
43, will prove crucial throughout the authors’ account. Both commitments re-
flect and account in significant part for the many empirically implausible and 
ethically troubling claims to which the authors are committed. The many em-
pirically vacuous claims to which they are committed are attributable to their 
other foundational commitment—namely, that to infinitely plastic state inter-
ests as telic ends. 
 72. Shocks, then, would be understood by reference to the explanatory 
models themselves, but we will see that such explaining never actually hap-
pens. 
 73. What counts as an “exogenous shock” sufficient to disturb a given 
equilibrium presumably will be understood by reference to the model em-
ployed to account for the equilibrium thus disturbed. So the authors will at 
least be equipped to hypothesize as to what sets a particular dynamic process 
in motion. 
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the spirit of Goldsmith and Posner’s statics would integrate the 
free (exogenous) variables of their static scenarios in some fash-
ion with the rough picture (story) of gradual information-
revealing bluff, bargain, and conflict that the authors have ear-
lier briefly suggested transpires between equilibria.74 And 
given the surprisingly rough-hewn character of the static mod-
els, such integration would not seem too much to ask. But 
again, not even such an integration will address the equilib-
rium-existence problem absent some refinement. I shall say 
more on the difficulties these absences occasion in Part III and 
Part IV. 
Despite their abstention from constructing a dynamic 
model of state interaction, our authors nonetheless commit 
themselves to the task of “argu[ing] that some combination” of 
the four static “models” will, presumably in combination with 
independent data concerning “power” and “interests,”75 “ex-
plain[] state behaviors associated with international law.”76 
“These models,” they admit, “do not exhaust the possibilities of 
international interaction.”77 But they do “provide a simple and 
useful framework for evaluating a range of international legal 
regimes.”78 “[E]ach model has different characteristics that 
make it more or less stable and effective [at what?], depending 
on the [which?] circumstances.”79 “Taken together, however, the 
four models offer a different explanation for the state behaviors 
associated with international law than the explanation usually 
offered in international law scholarship.”80 The “different ex-
planation” is that international law is a product of “self-
 
 74. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 11. 
 75. Because “power” and “interests” are taken as exogenous variables ac-
counting for endogenous international law, they must be independently de-
fined, individuated, and located. However, we shall see that they seldom are in 
The Limits. 
 76. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 13. In view of the upcoming 
illustration of international law as epiphenomenal, it is reasonable to suppose 
that they will explain state behavior by reference to the models—which do not, 
crucially, ever themselves involve law as explicandum, meaning that law is 
assumed away as causative by the models themselves—and then will simply 
assert that what purports to be law is a sort of hologram generated by that 
behavior. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. “Evaluating” here is never explained, and thus the claimed useful-
ness of the admittedly simple framework remains obscure. The most charita-
ble answer appears to be that which I have just proposed. See supra note 76. 
 79. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 13. 
 80. Id. 
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interested” (and bilateral) state interaction, rather than—and 
this curious contrast is crucial—a (multilaterally constructed 
and enforced) check upon such action.81  
In the absence of a dynamic model, of course, such a claim 
will be quite conveniently easy to sustain, though it will also in 
consequence be interminably contestable and ultimately, one 
fears, uninformative. For causation, of course, is processual, or 
at the very least intertemporal, in character.82 At an instant, 
we do not have free (independent, exogenous) and bound (de-
pendent, endogenous) variables—or indeed variables at all if 
examining but a single pair of states such as Goldsmith and 
Posner’s commitment to bilaterality restricts us to doing—only 
copresence. That is not causation. A natural supposition that 
we might have made of any set of “rules” reached implicitly (by 
custom) or explicitly (by formal agreement) over time would be 
that they both are the product of interaction at one time or in-
terval and operative as a varyingly weak or strong constraint 
upon interaction at a subsequent time or interval. But an exer-
cise in single- or two-period statics, devoid of attention paid the 
process of adjustment from equilibrium to equilibrium, conven-
iently deflects our attention from the possibility of such sym-
bioses. And symbioses of that kind, I take it, are precisely what 
most “traditionalists,” as well as ordinary citizens, would sup-
pose to be at work in the evolution of international law.83  
The fact of symbioses of this kind also underwrites a hope, 
I believe, for ongoing progress—much of which has been at 
work over the past several decades—in rendering global life 
more just and more decent for all human beings. It therefore 
appears here already that, in the manner contemplated at the 
end of Part I, Goldsmith and Posner’s static analysis risks slid-
ing from positive vacuity to normative condemnability. Unless 
its further elaboration as discussed below fares better than it 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Causation is processual if time is continuous, and it is intertemporal if 
time is densely packed. See BERTRAND RUSSELL, PRINCIPLES OF MATHEMAT-
ICS, 447–79 (1903) (examining this distinction). 
 83. See, e.g., W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW IN CON-
TEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 1–13 (2004) (interpreting international law in rela-
tion to what is called “the global constitutive process”). A number of occasions 
arise in Parts III and IV to note the degree to which Goldsmith and Posner’s 
positions avoid obvious implausibility, as distinguished from convenient unfal-
sifiability, only when put forward in static contexts, while what they label 
“traditionalist” views turn out to be the more parsimonious and intuitively sat-
isfying accounts in dynamic contexts. 
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has in the preview, we shall suspect that the theory quite war-
rantlessly forecloses the very hope that “traditional” interna-
tional law theorists, with intertemporally richer and empiri-
cally more plausible understandings of global developmental 
processes, effectively underwrite. 
Goldsmith and Posner devote the remainder of their book 
to “applying [their] framework to various regimes of interna-
tional law.”84 Part 1 treats customary international law (CIL). 
Part 2 discusses treaty law. And Part 3 addresses “external 
challenges” to the account.85 Conspicuously absent is any atten-
tion paid the other two traditional sources of international law 
as “codified” in the enabling Statute of the International Court 
of Justice—“general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations” and “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary 
means for the determination of rules of law.”86 That lacuna, we 
will see, both dovetails with and is partly explicable by the 
other self-imposed limitations under which the authors labor in 
their accounts of customary and treaty law. Because treaties 
and especially custom proceed from actions taken by state lead-
ers in their official capacities, it is somewhat less obviously im-
plausible to take them for minimally efficacious, epiphenome-
nal traces of such actions than it would be to treat general 
principles, standards, or rules articulated by conscientious per-
sons endeavoring to opine impartially in similar fashion. We 
take up this gap again in Part III and Part IV. 
III.  THE LIMITS ELABORATED AND APPLIED—HENCE 
FOUND FURTHER WANTING 
As noted, Goldsmith and Posner elaborate and apply their 
theory to only two of the four or five traditional sources of in-
ternational law—custom and treaty. We consider these in turn. 
A. THE LIMITS ON CUSTOM 
1. Elaborated 
Part 1 of The Limits considers CIL. Citing the Restatement 
of U.S. Foreign Relations Law (and nothing else), the authors 
 
 84. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 13. 
 85. Id. at 13–14. 
 86. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, §§ 1(c), (d), June 
26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].  
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report that CIL “is typically defined as the general and consis-
tent practice of states that they follow from a sense of legal ob-
ligation.”87 That sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris, is of-
ten labeled “the ‘psychological’ element” of CIL.88 
CIL is of course notoriously elusive and open-ended. Its 
“psychological component” cannot be directly observed, but re-
quires “objective,” “behavioral” indicia.89 And sometimes, there-
fore, the behavioral element might be employed objectionably 
as a stand-in for the psychological component, rendering the 
latter effectively redundant.90 The behavioral element itself can 
be difficult to discern or pin down.91 For the concepts of “state 
practice,” “norm crystallization,” “widespreadness” and “uni-
formity,” upon which salient behavior’s individuation depends 
generate problems of appropriate description and contouring, 
particularly when it is evolutionary processes that we are ob-
serving. While such problems have long been familiar to law-
yers, particularly common lawyers, Goldsmith and Posner ap-
pear to regard them as scandalous, evidently longing for a 
world in which lawyers, like chemists or Platonists, might traf-
fic in natural kinds or pure forms. 
Thus, our authors report, “There is little agreement about 
what type of state action counts as state practice.”92 And the 
possibility arises that “[t]hose who study and use customary in-
ternational law—courts, arbitrators, diplomats, politicians, 
scholars—invoke these sources selectively.”93 Similar dangers 
of source-selectivity afflict questions of widespreadness and 
uniformity, since there are “190 or so states.”94 
Apparently the danger of source-selectivity afflicts findings 
of opinio juris as well. For what evidence counts and “[t]he ap-
propriate conditions for the use of such evidence are unset-
tled.”95 Moreover, “there is no convincing explanation of the 
process by which a voluntary behavioral regularity transforms 
 
 87. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 23 (citing RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE U.S. § 102(2) (1987)). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 24. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See id. at 23–24. 
 92. Id. at 23 (emphasis added). 
 93. Id. at 23–24. 
 94. Id. at 24. 
 95. Id. 
HOCKETT_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:32:45 AM 
2006] THE LIMITS OF THEIR WORLD 1741 
 
itself into a binding legal obligation”96—though no account on 
offer is actually named and critiqued. This latter statement is 
an ironic lament in view of now-burgeoning literatures con-
cerned with precisely the evolution and “internalization” of cus-
tomary norms.97 Indeed, one of our authors is himself a distin-
guished contributor on the topic, at least of such evolution if 
not internalization.98 But perhaps because invoking those lit-
eratures in the CIL context would frustrate the authors’ pre-
ferred picture of CIL as unremittingly epiphenomenal,99 they 
simply complain about the gap they perceive between regular-
ity and normativity in traditional scholarship rather than dis-
cussing possible—or now proffered—solutions.100 
Goldsmith and Posner announce that rather than attempt-
ing to resolve, they will simply sidestep the “issues” that they 
identify.101 They will focus instead upon “two sets of issues that 
are rarely discussed in the international law literature but that 
are fundamental to understanding” CIL.102 The first set of is-
sues comprises “the unarticulated assumptions that underlie 
the traditional conception of” CIL as “unitary, universal, and 
exogenous.”103 It is unclear how these “issues” differ from those 
that the authors report they will sidestep. Goldsmith and Pos-
 
 96. Id. 
 97. See, e.g., DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Greg-
ory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000); HABERMAS, supra note 19; Goodman & 
Jinks, supra note 34. 
 98. See, e.g., ERIC POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 36–46 (2000) (han-
dling, with sensitivity, accounts of exogenously operative and occasionally in-
ternalized normativity).  
 99. The authors’ preferred picture is discussed infra Part III.A. 
 100. One might imagine a fruitful line of inquiry by way of filling the gap 
that began with the psychological findings on norm internalization and pro-
ceeded to a theory of state leaders’ parallel internalization by acting in official 
capacities and identifying with their states, thereby investing their states with 
personality and some capacity for quasi-socialization. One might imagine our 
authors themselves taking this line, given their methodological choice of lead-
ers as proxies of states, and given one of the authors’ interest in social norms. 
At the very least one might have imagined them grappling with the interest-
ing recent work of Professors Goodman and Jinks along these lines. See, e.g., 
Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How To Influence States: Socialization and In-
ternational Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004) [hereinafter Good-
man & Jinks, How to Influence States]; Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Inter-
national Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative 
Challenges, 54 DUKE L.J. 983 (2005) [hereinafter Goodman & Jinks, Interna-
tional Law and State Socialization] .  
 101. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 25. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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ner describe unitarity as identity of behaviors’ “logical form.”104 
This the authors do not further explain, nor does the concept 
find further employment in the text.105 “Universality” refers to 
CIL’s binding all states save those that persistently object dur-
ing a rule’s crystallization.106 And “exogeneity” denotes a rule’s 
operating as “an external force that influences states.”107 Our 
authors announce that their “theory . . . [will] challenge[] each 
of these assumptions.”108 
The “second set of issues” that Goldsmith and Posner deem 
fundamental to understanding CIL and yet insufficiently dis-
cussed by traditionalists “concerns the traditional paradigm’s 
inability to explain international behavior.”109 The “traditional 
paradigm” apparently ought, but cannot, explain “how [CIL] 
emerges from disorder”; “how it changes over time”; “why [it] 
changes in response to shifts in the relative power of states, 
advances in technology, and other exogenous forces”; why 
“states frequently change their views about the content” of CIL; 
“why domestic courts and politicians almost always apply a 
conception of [CIL] that is in the state’s best interest”; why 
states violate their promises to obey CIL; or “why states comply 
with” CIL.110 Yet these “issues,” much like the first set of is-
sues, we shall find to receive minimal if any consideration in 
The Limits itself. 
 
 104. Id. (emphasis added). 
 105. The concept of logical form is familiar to linguistics and mathematical 
logic. E.g., NORBERT HORNSTEIN, LOGICAL FORM: FROM GB TO MINIMALISM 
(1995). But Goldsmith and Posner do not address what they have in mind. 
Presumably it relates to isomorphism among certain relations—ordered sets of 
behaviorally linked states—claimed to have come to constitute customs. So, for 
example, let R be a dyadic relation defined over pairs of states, such that “Rxy” 
is true if and only if x acts in the R manner toward y. If it comes to pass that 
over time we increasingly observe such circumstances as Rab, Rba, Rac, Rbc, 
etc., and there appears to be a sense of obligation among the leaders of the 
first named states to relate their states to the second named states in that R 
manner, then the R relation might come to be called “customary.” Goldsmith 
and Posner’s professed concern over a unitarity assumption conveys skepti-
cism as to whether there ever is any sufficiently well-individuated and recur-
ring such R in the first place, rather than, say, Rab in one case, Sba in the 
next, Tac in the next, etc. But they provide no reasons, and there seems no ob-
vious difficulty in singling out all manner of such “R relations,” for example 
refraining from invading absent an imminent threat extending diplomatic 
immunity, etc. 
 106. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 25. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 25–26. 
HOCKETT_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:32:45 AM 
2006] THE LIMITS OF THEIR WORLD 1743 
 
Having thus set the stage, Goldsmith and Posner next be-
gin elaborating their theory. This asserts that “numerous . . . 
combinations of coincidence of interest, coercion, bilateral pris-
oner’s dilemmas, and bilateral coordination” will better account 
for “many apparently [but illusorily] cooperative universal be-
havioral regularities” among states than does “the standard ac-
count” that CIL “governs all or almost all states.”111 This of 
course sets the stage for a point-by-point comparison of the au-
thors’ account and some “traditional” account in respect of some 
illustrative regularities. But we soon shall find that this expec-
tation goes unfulfilled. 
Goldsmith and Posner recognize that it will at least ini-
tially appear odd to undertake to explain purportedly univer-
sally applicable CIL by reference to merely bilateral games.112 
They apologize for the oddity by expressing skepticism about 
the prospect of employing multilateral strategic models. They 
offer several reasons: (1) Monitoring costs rise with the number 
of “players.”113 (2) Also with such a rise in the number of play-
ers, the likelihood falls of mutual understanding as to what 
constitutes cooperation. The likelihood similarly falls of (3) 
states employing mutually low discount rates, (4) shared expec-
tations of indefinite game-iteration, and (5) mutually high 
benefit/cost differentials as between cooperation and defec-
tion.114 
But Goldsmith and Posner say nothing about why they 
suppose that the empirical eventuation of these armchair-
speculated tendencies would prove quantitatively decisive. Nor 
do they consider the possibility that the listed factors, should 
they prove empirically operative, might simply limit likely val-
ues of n in an n-party “game” without limiting it to so low a 
value as 2.115 So, for reasons that remain mysterious, it will 
 
 111. Id. at 35. These are the “models” described earlier, see id. at 11–12, 
now supplemented by several four-celled tables (two actors facing binary 
choices), see id. at 27–34, of the kind reliably encountered in beginning texts 
on game theory. 
 112. Id. at 36. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. 
 115. It seems intuitively more plausible, for example, to hypothesize more 
variable functional relations between changes in the number of players and 
changes in the supposed likelihoods, rather than a Goldsmith/Posner style 
switching function. The actual functions presumably would manifest concav-
ity, such that the move from two to three players scarcely affects likelihoods 
(1) through (5) at all, the move from three to four a bit more, etc. In such case 
multilaterality with n > 2 could well be the norm, and all that would vary 
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counter-intuitively be Goldsmith and Posner’s bilateral gaming 
versus the traditionalists near-universal opinio juris where CIL 
is concerned, though the two competing views never actually 
end up being cross-compared by reference to parsimony, 
mechanism-intuitive plausibility, empirical corroboration, or 
any of the earlier cited “issues” mentioned by our authors’ in 
their argument. 
2. Applied 
Our authors next turn to what they call “applying” their 
theory by examining four case studies116 “chosen on the basis of 
their prominence and on the availability of a detailed historical 
record.”117 The authors, however, spare us the mentioned de-
tails. The first study reports that the United States was a 
champion of the “free ships, free goods” rule during the seventy 
years it was not a belligerent in any major conflict, then 
stretched, bent, and selectively interpreted the rule during the 
Civil War.118 Little is said about what interest the United 
States was “maximizing” or why the United States interpreted 
the rule liberally (or indeed at all) rather than simply disre-
garding or abrogating it.119 Also conspicuously absent is any 
reference to “coincidence of interest,” “coercion,” “cooperation,” 
or “coordination” by, of, or between the United States and any 
other state.120 So the models go unused, and the possibility that 
opinio juris played some causal role in motivating or modulat-
ing behavior is effectively ignored. 
Next the study explains that during the Spanish-American 
War, no state violated the “free ships, free goods” rule, possibly 
because Spain’s weak navy and the presence of few seizable 
goods on neutral ships gave rise to a coincidence of interest.121 
Thereupon the authors report that during the Boer War the  
 
 
would be the precise value of n > 2 from norm to norm. 
 116. The four case studies “are the ‘free ships, free goods’ rule of wartime 
maritime commerce; the breadth of the territorial sea; ambassadorial immu-
nity; and the wartime exception from prize for coastal fishing vessels.” GOLD-
SMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 45. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 46–48. 
 119. That proves significant below in connection with the prospect of more 
parsimoniously and plausibly explaining state behavior without assuming 
away normativity. 
 120. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 11–12. 
 121. Id. at 48–49. 
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British first abided by the rule, then stretched its interpreta-
tion for a few months as the United States had done during its 
Civil War (rather than abrogating or disregarding it), then re-
turned to strict adherence under threat of retaliation from the 
United States and Germany.122 The authors find a similar story 
in the Russo-Japanese War, save that the Russians were more 
cynical than the British in loosely interpreting the rule before 
threats of retaliation.123 The only model at work here appears 
to be coercion,124 which as employed resembles what tradition-
alists call (informal) “enforcement” in the international system. 
And as in the Civil War case, the authors make no attempt to 
account for Britain or Russia’s differential regard for the rule, 
or for the choice to stretch interpretations rather than simply 
to violate the rule. Opinio juris, by contrast, might well so ac-
count, and so afford more nuance, intuitive intelligibility, and 
empirical explanatory success to traditionalists than The Lim-
its grants Goldsmith and Posner. Finally on “free ships, free 
goods,” Goldsmith and Posner offer a few words on the First 
World War,125 which they report “is well known [to have] de-
stroyed any pretense of a law of maritime rights.”126 The rea-
son? It is “no doubt because of changes in technology, stakes, 
and interests.”127 Oh. 
Goldsmith and Posner tell a similarly sketchy tale of state 
hypocrisy in respect of the CIL of territorial waters.128 More 
than explanations, we find here proto-explanations, plausible 
hypotheses that might, but also might not, be borne out by in-
tensive empirical study of the “incident report” sort rendered 
familiar by practitioners of the New Haven school of interna-
tional law scholarship.129 That latter school and methodology, 
incidentally and indeed astonishingly, receive literally no men-
 
 122. Id. at 49–50. 
 123. Id. at 50–51. 
 124. See id. at 12 (explaining the coercion model). 
 125. See id. at 51–52. 
 126. Id. at 51. 
 127. Id. at 52. Goldsmith and Posner fail to specify which “technology, 
stakes, and interests” caused the destruction of this legal concept. 
 128. Id. at 59–66. 
 129. Much has been written both on, and in the spirit of, the New Haven 
school. See generally CHEN, supra note 34, at 14–22. The canonical New Ha-
ven school casebook probably is REISMAN ET AL., supra note 83. Two well-
known introductions to international law written from the New Haven school 
point of view are CHEN, supra note 34, and ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS AND 
PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HOW WE USE IT (1994).  
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tion whatever in the text, index, or bibliography of our authors’ 
self-styled work of international law scholarship. 
Goldsmith and Posner’s ambassadorial immunity “case 
study”130 probably is their best. This perhaps is unsurprising. 
For diplomatic relations are of their very essence bilateral and 
cooperative in nature, hence trivially amenable to treatment as 
cases of iterated bilateral cooperation. So states in Goldsmith 
and Posner’s rendering turn out to be consistent in conferring 
and respecting diplomatic immunity.131 And the interest in on-
going communication between governments, coupled with 
states’ roughly equal retaliatory capacities, unsurprisingly af-
fords incentives to cooperate. Bilateral diplomatic relations also 
typically satisfy the prerequisites for long-term cooperation, 
while conspicuous failures of these prerequisites to obtain are 
readily found in the best known cases of violation of diplomatic 
immunity.132 
Goldsmith and Posner’s final case study is a close reading 
and critique of the venerable Paquete Habana decision of the 
United States Supreme Court,133 a decision commonly cited for 
its observation that CIL “is part of our [U.S.] law.”134 Here the 
discussion, which is more or less continuous with the authors’ 
earlier treatment of “free ships, free goods,” is devoted princi-
pally to an alleged selectivity in the Court’s marshalling of evi-
dence.135 The charge here is somewhat ironic in view of the 
treatment that our authors themselves have given “free ships, 
free goods” only several pages (and fully several case studies) 
earlier.136  
B. THE LIMITS ON TREATY LAW 
1. Elaborated 
Goldsmith and Posner’s account of treaty law serves as a 
sort of adjunct to their account of custom. Treaties, in the au-
 
 130. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 54–59. 
 131. See id. at 54–55. 
 132. See id. at 55–58. 
 133. See id. at 66–78. 
 134. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). 
 135. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 70–73. 
 136. See id. at 45–54. A critique of Paquete Habana also seems a bit out of 
place in a putative sequence of “case studies,” unless the authors intend here a 
pun on the word “case.”  
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thors’ rendering, simply clarify the contours of custom.137 And 
since custom is bilateral and akin to a “course of dealing” be-
tween two parties to a series of commercial transactions, trea-
ties are akin to written bilateral contracts that sharpen the 
terms of an ongoing relation. Goldsmith and Posner end up 
both appealing to, and disavowing, the contract analogy.138 And 
that ambivalence, we shall see, stems directly from an ulti-
mately futile attempt to have things both ways: on the one 
hand taking treaties for broadly significant, and on the other 
hand wishing to strip them, as they have done the custom upon 
which treaties are parasitic in their account, of both multilat-
erality and normative importance. 
“The conventional international lawyer’s wisdom about 
treaties,” Goldsmith and Posner report, “is uncomplicated.”139 
When states enter agreements, they obligate themselves to 
comply with those agreements. Pacta sunt servanda.140 “Under 
mainstream international law theory,” a treaty “enhances com-
pliance [with an agreement] by increasing the normative 
strength of the agreement and thus a state party’s sense of ob-
ligation.”141 Mainstream international law scholars accordingly 
“explore the conditions for normativity and urge that these 
conditions . . . be strengthened whenever possible.”142 
Goldsmith and Posner acknowledge that traditionalists 
recognize (a) that states sometimes violate treaty provisions, 
and (b) that imprecision in terms, inadequate “third-party” en-
forcement power, and self-aggrandizing behavior sometimes ac-
count for such violations.143 Our authors also acknowledge the 
existence of formal agreements among states that do not pur-
port to carry the force of law—so-called “nonlegal agreements,” 
sometimes labeled “soft law.”144 And they recognize that 
“[c]onventional wisdom about nonlegal agreements is more var-
ied” than that about treaty law.145 But these “nods” to the var-
 
 137. See id. at 84–85. 
 138. Compare id. at 90 (finding “limited value” in drawing an analogy be-
tween international agreements and domestic contracts), with id. at 98 (ex-
plaining that international agreements and contracts are analogous as both 
convey the seriousness of commitment). 
 139. Id. at 83. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See id. at 83–84. “Traditionalists” too, then, can be “realists” in part. 
 144. See id. 
 145. Id. at 84. 
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ied and protean nature of contemporary international law are 
all that we find.146 And the want of more attention to these re-
cent developments does not simply render The Limits curiously 
“retro” in flavor; we shall see that it leads our authors into con-
ceptually troubled waters. 
In putative contrast to “the traditional view” (or views) of 
explicit international agreements, Goldsmith and Posner’s view 
of “[t]he basic logic . . . of treaties and nonlegal agreements fol-
lows directly from the models of cooperation and coordination 
set forth in part 1.”147 (“Coercion” and “coincidence” will now 
largely drop from view.) In essence, the guiding idea is that 
successful cooperation requires shared understanding as to 
what counts as cooperation—coordinated interpretation of what 
we might call the “essential terms” of cooperation. “If [CIL] is 
weak because of its ambiguity, then states will have strong in-
centives to clarify [CIL] by communicating with each other.”148 
Now in view of Goldsmith and Posner’s treatment of cus-
tom as epiphenomenal and possessed of no normative pull in 
any event, it is mysterious how it could be “weak” or why states 
would bear incentives to “strengthen” it.149 So presumably what 
Goldsmith and Posner have in mind here is that states bear in-
centives to render explicit—by treaty or nonlegal agreement—
the implicit coordinative settlements that their solely interest-
driven, not law-driven, behaviors amount to. And so explicit in-
ternational agreements—treaties and “nonlegal agreements” 
alike—both will on Goldsmith and Posner’s account collapse 
into essentially but one phenomenon. Both will amount to  
 
 
 146. I allude here in part to the explosion of attention now being paid to 
both (a) “soft law” that emerges from “networks” or “epistemic communities” of 
substate regulators, academics, and affiliates of nongovernmental organiza-
tions, and (b) the “disaggregated state” whose officials belong to those “com-
munities.” See generally CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 5, at 250–70 (on non-
governmental organizations); SLAUGHTER, supra note 5, at 36–64 (on 
regulators); Raustiala, supra note 5, passim (discussing the role networks play 
in international cooperation).  
 147. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 84. Coercion and coincidence 
now largely drop from view. 
 148. Id. at 85. This all comes as something of a surprise. In Part 1 of The 
Limits, the authors did not argue that CIL was weak as a result of ambiguity. 
See supra notes 104–05 and accompanying text. The authors also did not ar-
gue that states maintained strong interests either in strengthening CIL or in 
clarifying it. I leave this curious discontinuity between the authors’ treatments 
of CIL and treaty law to the side for present purposes. 
 149. Shadows are not “weak” or “strong.” 
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memoranda of bilateral understanding—“you scratch my back, 
I’ll scratch yours” affairs. 
The suggestion that explicit agreements might clarify cus-
tom of course is not novel, and our authors acknowledge that.150 
What will be unique to our authors, then, will be, first, as with 
their account of CIL, the attempt again to prune away “the nor-
mative element”; and second, again as in the treatment of cus-
tom, the attempt to portray the law as being bilateral in char-
acter. Ironically, these two intimately related, distinguishing 
marks of Goldsmith and Posner’s theory are precisely what get 
them into trouble. 
Consider first the authors’ handling of multilaterality.151 
Their account of CIL, recall, is as a sort of ersatz-universal, er-
satz-prescriptive shadow cast by what “really” are discreet 
pairs of merely self-aggrandizing states interacting. An obvious 
empirical challenge to such an account is the universality or 
near-universality that norms must claim if they are to be des-
ignated “custom” at all. Our authors attempted to address that 
challenge, we observed, essentially by impugning the empirical 
premise. First they attempted to erode the hard-definitional 
contours of behavioral regularity claims,152 in effect suggesting 
doubts ringing obliquely of Wittgensteinian-by-way-of-
Kripkean “rule skepticism.”153 Second they accused traditional-
ists of deploying corroborative evidence of regularity selec-
tively.154 Finally, they selectively deployed what they took for 
some contrary evidence of their own.155 
But this strategy cannot even pretend to work in respect of 
treaties or treaty-based international institutions. For in those 
cases universality of signature is both (a) all that is required for 
the norm that concerns us to purport to be multilaterally bind-
 
 150. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 83–84. 
 151. See id. at 85–88. 
 152. See id. at 85–86. 
 153. See SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LAN-
GUAGE: AN ELEMENTARY EXPOSITION (1982) (taking Wittgenstein for having 
shown that rules do not determine the ranges of their own applications, hence 
that workable rules presuppose normative communities which fix rules’ appli-
cability ranges simply through contingently common behavioral usage). Saul 
Kripke is rebutted on exegetical and other grounds by G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. 
HACKER, SKEPTICISM, RULES AND LANGUAGE (1984), as well as by others. An 
excellent discussion of the appropriation of Kripke by legal scholars is found in 
BRIAN BIX, LAW, LANGUAGE, AND LEGAL DETERMINACY 36–62 (1993). 
 154. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 86–87. 
 155. See id. at 87–88. 
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ing, and (b) readily verified as present. How, then, are we to ac-
count for the existence of expressly multilateral formal agree-
ments purporting to carry the force of law, while also claiming 
that such agreements “really” are no more than interpretive ad-
juncts clarifying the precise terms of fundamentally norm-free, 
bilateral, self-aggrandizing state behavior? 
Sometimes, I think, it is best to conclude that “a cigar is 
just a cigar.”156 The most intuitively plausible, non-Ptolmeic 
explanation for the existence of multilateral agreements codify-
ing legal norms of appropriate behavior surely would be that 
states’ officials either (a) wish to endow reasonably well-defined 
norms of appropriate behavior with international legal force, 
(b) wish to join in a universally agreed intention or aspiration 
that such norms steadily, even if gradually, take on effectively 
“enforceable” force, (c) wish to appear to harbor such wishes, or 
(d) hold some combination of these wishes. Under any such sce-
nario, both the norm’s multilaterality and its normativity 
would be either forehandedly (in the first two circumstances) or 
backhandedly (in the third circumstance) acknowledged. And 
so normativity itself, understood as a derivative claim157 upon 
official conscience, and multilaterality, understood as the 
norm’s universality as to all signatories, would figure critically 
into any intelligible interpretation of the practice of treating. 
Normativity cannot discharge the appointed function in 
our authors’ account, however. For the latter must, if indefi-
nitely elastic state “interest” is to stand as a real and complete 
alternative to opinio juris, banish law-answerable conscience 
and normativity as ethical bindingness altogether. Nor can 
multilaterality, for its part, play the appointed role, since our 
authors are committed to bilaterality as the exclusive inter-
state relational mode. And so a cigar must “really” be, or 
“mean,” something other than a cigar in our authors’ unrecog-
nizable world, something hidden not only to traditional schol-
ars, but also to treaty-negotiating, -signing, -invoking, and -
enforcing agents themselves. It will be up to our authors to re-
veal for us the “secret meanings” of our own actions. 
 
 156. This remark has been attributed to Freud as his response to certain 
Freudians having taken psychoanalysis a bit far. See JOHN BARTLETT, FAMIL-
IAR QUOTATIONS: A COLLECTION OF PASSAGES, PHRASES, AND PROVERBS 
TRACED TO THEIR SOURCES IN ANCIENT AND MODERN LITERATURE 608 (Justin 
Kaplan, ed., 17th ed. 2002) (attributing this quotation to Freud). 
 157. By “derivative claim,” I mean a claim upon the official via the claim’s 
binding the state in whose name the official acts.  
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Goldsmith and Posner candidly grope for a means of simul-
taneously laying bare the “real” meaning of treaties, while ac-
counting for treaties’ apparent normativity and self-professed 
multilaterality. “What, then, is the point of multilateral treaty 
regimes?” they ask.158 “We argue that these regimes have an 
implicit two-step logic: in step 1, states come together and ne-
gotiate common terms; in step 2, states cooperate (or not) in 
pairs . . . .”159 
But simply having “a two-step logic”160 of course does not 
address the question that Goldsmith and Posner have set them-
selves. We remain left to wonder why “states come together and 
negotiate common terms”161 in the first place if, as the authors’ 
account both here and in Part 1 has it, all of states’ “interest”-
invoking dealings “really” are bilateral in nature. But leave this 
to one side for just a moment (we’ll come back to it), for what 
Goldsmith and Posner appear to have in mind by way of an an-
swer to the puzzlingly persistent multilaterality challenge 
emerges from their attempt to grapple with the other mystery 
that afflicts their account of treaty law, that of puzzlingly per-
sistent normativity. 
Normativity’s recalcitrance in Goldsmith and Posner’s 
world appears most starkly in their theory’s remarkable inca-
pacity to account for the presence of two distinct kinds of prac-
tice in which the authors explicitly recognize states to engage. 
Recall that states make not only agreements that explicitly 
purport to carry the force of law, but also another class of 
agreements that explicitly purport to do what our authors 
claim “really” to be the implicit purpose of all formal agree-
ments, including treaties—viz., to clarify intentions and thus 
the terms of cooperation.162 If states themselves already are ex-
plicitly aware of the function that Goldsmith and Posner claim 
to be implicit in all legal agreements, and if states act explicitly 
to discharge that nonlegal function in explicitly nonlegal 
agreements (which states expressly distinguish from treaties), 
then again, why are there legal agreements—treaties—at all, 
even bilaterally, let alone multilaterally? 
 
 
 158. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 87. 
 159. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. at 84–85. 
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Here our authors assay “three basic answers.”163 These 
turn out in each case either to fare no better than the earlier-
proffered explanation for multilaterality, or covertly to import 
normativity back into the explanatory picture. The first basic 
answer is that “treaties [unlike nonlegal agreements] usually 
require legislative consent, a process that conveys important 
information about state preferences for the treaty.”164 The “in-
formation” that Goldsmith and Posner have in mind appears to 
have mainly to do with the degree to which the legislature of a 
treaty partner holds “policy preferences” in favor of the treaty’s 
terms.165 
This “basic answer” appears, once one thinks about it, he-
roic. For one thing, the practice of treating long antedates the 
crystallization of a global norm acknowledging the propriety of 
democratic governance. It accordingly antedates the existence 
of independent legislatures, and such legislatures’ roles in do-
mestic treaty approval. For another thing, that norm is hardly 
yet fulsomely honored throughout the world, notwithstanding 
the authors’ claim that “[i]n most states, the legislature must 
consent to most agreements before they can be binding under 
international law.”166 And to the degree that legislatures act as 
“rubber stamps” to executives, the value added in respect of 
commitment-information by their treaty-stamping is propor-
tionally diminished. Finally, if all that is wanted is real “infor-
mation” about truly consequential “policy preferences,” there 
are means considerably less taxing than waiting for legislative 
scheduling, hearings, and debates over agreements purporting 
to bind with the force of law. 
Perhaps realizing that they have a problem here, Gold-
smith and Posner subtly turn to a particular form of informa-
tion purportedly conveyed by legislative involvement in treaty 
making: “legislative consent,” they observe, citing one institu-
tionalist,167 “can serve as a commitment that is separate from 
 
 163. Id. at 91. 
 164. Id. 
 165. See id. at 91–95. 
 166. Id. at 91. 
 167. Id. at 93 (citing LISA MARTIN, DEMORACTIC COMMITMENTS: LEGISLA-
TURES AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION (2000)). Institutionalists apparently 
are among the traditionalists with whom Goldsmith and Posner are in dis-
agreement, though less stark disagreement than with international lawyers 
who do not employ RCT. Institutionalists define themselves partly by contrast 
to the realists and neorealists with whom Goldsmith and Posner purport to be 
in fuller sympathy. They do so by declining to endogenize international re-
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the commitment that the executive alone makes.”168 Moreover, 
“the legislative consent process can send a credible signal about 
the president’s degree of commitment.”169 And, finally, to the 
degree that treaties are made part of domestic law and become 
enforceable in domestic courts, treaties yet further commit 
states to abiding by their terms.170 
But now what are we to make of this special form of “in-
formation conveyance” upon which Goldsmith and Posner fall 
back? What is this “commitment,” as distinguished from the 
mere “policy preference” to which it is proffered as an alterna-
tive, if not normative? And what is the “signaling” of “informa-
tion” concerning “commitment” to what purports to be a rule 
governing behavior, as distinguished from information concern-
ing a “preference” for that form of behavior, if not formal agree-
ment to be bound? 
Goldsmith and Posner appear obliquely to perceive the 
problem here and thus seek to disclaim the association, 
abruptly noting by way of apparent afterthought that “[i]t is 
important to note that [the calculus by which treaties are cho-
sen over nonlegal agreements] can be described without refer-
ence to the concept of normativity.”171 But the authors them-
selves certainly do not so describe things, offering, as they do, 
no more on the matter than the quoted conclusory denial. Nor 
do they indicate means by which they think anyone might do 
so. They might think that they have managed to do so by in-
canting the would-be normatively colorless word “information” 
repeatedly over the previous few pages. But they make critical 
use of the concept of commitment in endeavoring to explain 
what, if anything, in the way of “information” can be conveyed 
better by treaty than by nonbinding memorandum. And, at 
least in the absence of hostage exchange or some analogue 
thereto, it is only normativity that distinguishes commitment 
from mere announcement.172 
 
gimes and institutions as epiphenomenal. See, e.g., Robert O. Keohane & Lisa 
L. Martin, Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation, Paper prepared 
for “Progress in International Relations Theory: A Collaborative Assessment 
and Application of Imke Lakatos’s Methodology of Scientific Research Pro-
grams” at Scottsdale, AZ (Jan. 15–16, 1999) (on file with the author). 
 168. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4 at 93. 
 169. Id.  
 170. See id. at 94. 
 171. Id. at 95. 
 172. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 
75–76, 124–29, 134–37 (1996) (describing the significance of hostage exchange 
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We might draw the point out thus: Imagine that I say “I 
do” at my own wedding ceremony. The “I do” certainly imparts 
information, but what information? It informs witnesses that I 
am invoking the practice by which one binds oneself in matri-
mony. The “I do” is not merely informative, but also performa-
tive; and the fact of the performance here, by which I bring my-
self under the obligation, is itself the “information” that is 
conveyed. The latter, that is to say, is devoid of any salient con-
tent “apart from the concept of normativity.” There is no inter-
esting information absent the obligation. 
As if to acknowledge the difficulty here, Goldsmith and 
Posner offer, by way of a putative third reason to choose trea-
ties over nonlegal agreements a state’s purported desire “to 
convey the seriousness of [its] commitment to the agree-
ment.”173 But this is of course simply to repeat the original er-
ror. For what is it for a commitment to be “more serious”? Our 
authors invoke here an analogy that comes naturally to mind, 
but, alas, it is one that they have earlier expressly disavowed—
that to contract.174 A “legalized contract” amounts to “a more 
serious commitment” than a letter of intent or handshake, 
Goldsmith and Posner report, “because it is enforceable in 
court.”175 But that is of course to say that the agreement is ef-
fectively binding and treated as binding. And it is to suggest 
that there is some justificatory basis underlying the greater de-
gree of seriousness inhering in the more binding form of 
agreement. But what might that basis be? 
What renders a contract a “more serious commitment” un-
der domestic law than a letter of intent, the authors have ear-
lier acknowledged, is that violations of the former are “subject 
to reliable sanctions by independent third parties.”176 We might 
of course quarrel with the characterization of contract, involv-
ing as it does yet again our authors’ characteristic penchant for 
replacing—rather than complementing—individual conscience 
and a shared sense of decency with something more reminis-
cent of whippings or Skinnerian electrical shocks. But for pre-
sent purposes, our authors’ problem runs deeper: they already 
have disavowed the contract analogy to treaties177 precisely be-
 
as a means of credibly committing). 
 173. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 98 (emphasis added). 
 174. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.  
 175.  GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 98. 
 176. Id. at 90. 
 177. See id. at 98.  
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cause, they claim, there is no third-party sanction on the inter-
national plane.178 So there just is no remaining basis—no root, 
source, or backup—for the “greater degree of seriousness” or 
“strength of . . . commitment”179 that Goldsmith and Posner 
now say is supposed to attach to treaties relative to nonlegal 
agreements in their normatively emptied world. And we still 
require some such basis if we are to account for states’ routinely 
drawing the distinction. 
Goldsmith and Posner appear to think that they can sup-
ply the needed basis simply by reciting, at this point, yet an-
other magic word (like “information” before), now novelly label-
ing a treaty’s greater seriousness “purely a convention.”180 
That’s not very satisfying.181 For what are this “convention” 
and this “seriousness,” and what content can those words carry 
that might be described “without reference to the concept of 
normativity”? If I tell you, “one nod means that I mean what I 
say, and two nods mean that I really mean what I say,” I am 
assuredly proposing something that looks like a signaling con-
vention. But what work is the “really” doing here? And what 
then is the content of the “convention”? 
If we acknowledge normativity as “traditionalists” do, the 
answer is both simple and obvious: the convention amounts to a 
standard means by which to invoke the practice of treating—of 
promising between nations—a practice which gives rise to obli-
gations. It is accordingly a means of subjecting oneself to a 
norm for the benefit of—typically in return for reciprocal sub-
jection undertaken by—another. Recurring to the wedding 
analogy invoked earlier, saying “I do” and placing the ring on 
the other’s finger indeed constitute conventions by which I sig-
nal greater seriousness than would be signaled were I merrily 
to say, “with these petals I thee wed,” dropping flowers happily 
upon the head of my beloved while the two of us go skipping 
through the park. But what renders the former, conventional 
act “more serious” than the latter, whimsical act is precisely 
that it is the one which invokes the ineluctably normative 
commitment that is the vow. The “seriousness” is parasitic on 
the normativity; there is nothing else to ground it. 
 
 178. Id. at 90. That claim is not strictly correct either, but I leave the error 
to the side for now. 
 179. Id. at 99. 
 180. Id. at 98. 
 181. Perhaps we are punning again, now not upon “case,” but upon the 
synonymy between “convention” and “treaty.” 
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In sum, then, there just is no “here” here in our authors’ 
attempt to account for states’ distinguishing between treaties 
and nonlegal agreements via a putatively norm-free “conven-
tion.” The convention of signaling “serious commitment” or an 
intention to be bound will be intelligible as such, and thus 
workable as a convention bearing performative significance 
hence salient informative content, only against a prior back-
drop of normativity—the normativity that ineluctably attends 
commitment.182 
Now it is of course a commonplace that domestic law, in-
cluding the law of contract, is more reliably, uniformly, and im-
partially enforceable than is international law, and that con-
tracts accordingly might afford parties some greater certainty 
in collaborating, planning their affairs, and providing for their 
futures than treaties do states. That is indeed the principal 
reason that Goldsmith and Posner offer for disavowing the con-
tract analogy before they avow it.183 But it is nearly as well-
recognized—save, perhaps, by some Skinnerians and war-
planners—that were uniformed personnel, jails, and court-
rooms alone all that stood between persons and venality (or 
worse), we should all be inhabiting a most venal world—
domestically as well as internationally—indeed. And so plausi-
ble interpreters of domestic legality endeavor to integrate ac-
counts of the empirical functioning of law with accounts of the 
roles of less formal custom, norms, normativity, shame, con-
science, and decency in human life. That is what “conventional” 
scholars of international law do as well, as they attend both to 
what fills the gaps left by nonomnipresent, uniformed punish-
ment-administerers in the global community, and to the proc-
esses by which more regularized norm-observance and—
enforcement develop.184 There appears to be no more 
mechanico-intuitively plausible or variable-wise parsimonious 
 
 182. On the background conditions presupposed by successful conventions 
that solve coordination problems, and on the relations between normativity 
and convention, see DAVID K. LEWIS, CONVENTION: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 
97–100 (1969). 
 183.  See supra note 138 and accompanying text.  
 184. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 208–31 (lithographic reprint 
1963) (1961) (describing the international legal system as amounting to a hori-
zontally enforced legal system, albeit one at a primitive stage of development); 
see also Goodman & Jinks, supra note 34, at 1753–65 (arguing that state do-
mestic policies are a reflection of globally legitimated agendas); Goodman & 
Jinks, How To Influence States, supra note 100, at 646–56 (asserting that 
states are influenced by global norms through an acculturalization process). 
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way to do that save by some either overt or covert “reference to 
. . . normativity.” Traditionalists’ such references, thankfully, 
are both transparent and suggestive of further empirical re-
search. Goldsmith and Posner’s, so far as I can discern, are oc-
cult and dead-ended. 
Our authors’ remaining proffered reason for states’ choos-
ing treaties over nonlegal agreements is to “take advantage of 
the interpretive rules that apply to treaties” as codified in the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.185 The claim is cog-
nate with the familiar observation that default rules such as 
those found in contract law, state corporations codes, and the 
like help to scale-economize on contract-completion costs in the 
domestic sphere.186 As with our authors’ earlier attempts to re-
duce treaties’ normativity to vacuous “information,” then vacu-
ous “convention,” however, the present would-be explanation 
likewise places the cart before the horse. “Interpretive rules” 
become necessary among nations only once there is some com-
monly employed form of written agreement apart from memo-
randa of understanding (since the latter are themselves sets of 
bilaterally agreed interpretive rules). And the only such com-
monly employed form of agreement is the treaty, which as we 
have noted memorializes something freighted with irreducibly 
normative significance—mutual commitment. So default rules 
exist to facilitate mutual committing—contracting or treating. 
Committing, contracting, and treating do not take place in or-
der to afford opportunities to use default rules. 
From their attempts to explain states’ choices as between 
treaties and nonlegal agreements on nonnormative grounds, 
our authors next turn to endeavoring to explain state compli-
ance with treaties on nonnormative grounds. Goldsmith and 
Posner first draw a putative distinction between what they la-
bel “two schools” of thought about compliance—those who at-
tribute compliance to “instrumental” reasons and those who at-
tribute compliance to “noninstrumental” reasons.187 But this 
distinction, like the pseudo-concept of “instrumental rational-
 
 185. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 95. To locate the convention, 
see Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
331. 
 186. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Con-
tracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE. L.J. 87, 89–90 (1989) 
(describing arguments that default rules economize transaction costs). 
 187. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 100. 
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ity” itself, is entirely otiose.188 There simply is nothing “nonin-
strumental” in any interesting sense about normativity, norm-
observance, or norm-enforcement, particularly when “interests” 
are left altogether unspecified as Goldsmith and Posner have 
left them. The question always is what one “instrumentally” 
pursues—good of self, good of others, good of world legal order, 
etc.—in complying with or acting to vindicate a treaty’s provi-
sions, not whether one “instrumentally” pursues something in 
doing so. So what Goldsmith and Posner appear actually to 
mean to say here is, as in their treatment of custom, that 
states’ objects in conforming to or vindicating treaty provisions 
are better understood “without reference to the concept of nor-
mativity” or “normative pull.” But once again they provide no 
such better understanding at all. 
The “instrumentalist” school of accounting for treaty com-
pliance, Goldsmith and Posner report, posits that “states com-
ply with treaties when it is in their rational self-interest to do 
so, and not otherwise.”189 “Interest” here is, as in Part 1, still 
left unspecified. But for reasons adduced in the previous para-
graph we must take it for excluding interests in the good of 
others, the good of global order, or norms. Now “[w]ithin the ra-
tional choice school,” in turn, “two types of explanation are 
given for compliance: retaliation and reputation.”190 “The sim-
plest explanation for why a state might comply with a treaty,” 
Goldsmith and Posner report, “is that it fears retaliation or 
some other failure of cooperation or coordination if it does 
not.”191 The authors briefly elaborate with a familiar scenario 
in which two states agree not to overfish and each refrains from 
 
 188. Is there any concept of rationality that is not understood by reference 
to the suitability of chosen means to stated ends? The only candidate of which 
I am aware would be a so-called “rationality of ends.” E.g., HENRY S. 
RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS (1994). But even this 
implicitly imports an “end beyond the ends,” so to speak, relative to which 
those “ends” are means. Typically this end is labeled “human flourishing,” or 
“the good life” itself. See id.; see also JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATU-
RAL RIGHTS 23, 67, 87, 219–21. (1992); cf. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIR-
TUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 186 (Am. ed., Univ. of Notre Dame Press 
1981) (1981) (on virtues as means conducing to broader human ends such as 
Aristotle’s “the good life for man”). 
 189. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 100. 
 190. Id. The “rational choice school” appears simply to be another name for 
what the authors are calling the “instrumentalist” school. The authors paren-
thetically note that some “noninstrumentalist” scholars invoke reputational 
arguments as well. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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overfishing because it fears that its doing so will lead the other 
to overfish.192 Then follows another brief and familiar scenario 
in which two states agree upon standards for wireless commu-
nication from which neither subsequently departs because 
there is little point in doing so.193 
The first scenario, which admits of a role for retaliation or 
at any rate cooperative breakdown, no more excludes norma-
tive attitudes, ethicality, legality, or efficacy than the existence 
of a neighborhood police force renders laws against theft from 
or dumping upon the lawn of my neighbor ethically nonbinding, 
ethical attitude-inoffensive, or ineffective. So it affords no basis 
upon which to claim to be offering a useful alternative account 
of treaty-compliance to that offered by “noninstrumentalists,” 
i.e., norm-respecters. 
The second scenario, not requiring a role for retaliation, 
might not require a role for normativity, though this point can 
certainly be argued.194 But our authors say nothing about what 
portion of treaty regimes are of this purely coordinative type in 
any event. Hence we would have no idea whether anything of 
significance has been or can be said about the prospects for 
banishing normativity from treaty law per our authors’ inten-
tions even were we to concede the point. In view of the obvious 
point that many—if not indeed most—treaties actually are not 
of that purely and merely coordinative type, then, Goldsmith 
and Posner’s first instrumentalist school of treaty compliance 
does not appear to be significantly at odds with normativity at 
all. 
“The second instrumental approach to treaty compliance,” 
according to Goldsmith and Posner, “concerns reputation.”195 
“Reputation,” in turn, “refers to other states’ beliefs about the 
 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id. at 100–01. 
 194. See, e.g., ROBERT B. BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT: REASONING, REP-
RESENTING, AND DISCURSIVE COMMITMENT (1994) (concerning the ineluctable 
normativity of those forms of coordination and communication which are rea-
soning, cognition, and communication themselves); see also KRIPKE, supra 
note 153; LEWIS, supra note 182. Cognate recognition is found, of course, 
throughout the writings of Kant, Frege, and Wittgenstein, whose works inform 
Brandom’s. See, e.g., GOTTLOB FREGE, POSTHUMOUS WRITINGS 1–146 (H. 
Hermes et al. trans. 1979); IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 
(Norman Kemp Smith trans., MacMillan & Co. 1929) (1781); LUDWIG WITT-
GENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1953); 
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, REMARKS ON THE FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS 
(G.H. von Wright et al., trans., 1st M.I.T. paperback ed. 1967) (1956). 
 195. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 101. 
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likelihood that the state in question will comply with a 
treaty.”196 As with retaliation (and earlier, CIL), then, Gold-
smith and Posner apparently wish to, and believe that they 
can, strip reputation of any normative attitudinal element. 
Reputation would be reduced to a probability measure, just as 
retaliation in the “first instrumentalist approach” was puta-
tively reduced to a mechanical operation uninflected by evalua-
tive opinion, and just as commitment, per Goldsmith and Pos-
ner’s earlier attempt to account for treaties as distinguished 
from nonlegal agreements, was purportedly reduced to “infor-
mation.” But the attempt to replace norm-words—“commit-
ment,” “obligation,” “seriousness”—with would-be normatively 
colorless counterparts—“information,” “channeling,” “mere con-
vention”—proves no less vainly incantatory here than it was 
before. 
Goldsmith and Posner once again appear to realize 
obliquely that they have a problem: “the reputation argument 
must be made with care,” they caution.197 For, among other 
things, “there are methodological reasons for resisting the as-
sumption that states [even do] incur a reputational cost when 
ever they violate a treaty.”198 The “methodological reasons,” 
specified by reference to the book’s Introduction, appear to have 
to do with the link that I have just discussed between reputa-
tion and normativity. The idea of a “reputational cost” is 
scarcely intelligible save against a background condition of 
normativity. Our authors appear vaguely to appreciate this 
connection, and since they seek to banish normativity, they are 
uncomfortable with reputation. The problem, of course, is that 
there is a cognate link between normativity and retaliation, so 
our authors should be uncomfortable with that one as well. 
If we wish to add nuance to a norm-inflected retaliation-
based or reputation-based account of treaty compliance, we 
must consider the “surface” or “interface” (forgive me) between 
states along which they interact—i.e., the persons through 
whom states act and the institutional roles that those persons 
discharge. This is precisely what more subtle scholars of inter-
national law compliance have done.199 In the influential ac-
 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. at 102. 
 198. Id. at 103. 
 199. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International 
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997); see also Goodman & Jinks, How To Influence 
States, supra note 100; Goodman & Jinks, International Law and State So-
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count of former Assistant Secretary of State Dean Koh, for ex-
ample, states delegate responsibility for their interstate inter-
actions to agencies and the personnel who run them, and the 
latter accordingly concern themselves with the norms govern-
ing interstate interaction. That continually iterated participa-
tion in the interstate system naturally generates habits of com-
pliance with, and even personal internalization (into 
conscience) of, the relevant norms on the part of the persons 
through whom the agencies, on behalf of their states, act. 
Goldsmith and Posner’s response to the intuitively plausi-
ble internalization hypothesis as at least part of a satisfactory 
explanatory mechanism for treaty compliance is curious. First 
they remark in conclusory fashion that “[t]here is little empiri-
cal evidence for this view,”200 though no evidence is actually 
mentioned and no contrary evidence is offered.201 Then comes 
an innuendo to the effect that such internalization as occurs 
might be simply a matter of “bureaucratic self-serving[ness]” 
and thus an agency cost.202 Again we are offered no reason why 
we should suppose this and again we receive no explanation as 
to what would be intelligible as a “cost” to our state or its lead-
ers.203 Compounding the problem, Goldsmith and Posner next 
(again in conclusory fashion) report that “bureaucratic compli-
ance [with treaties] is based on aggregate cost-benefit analy-
 
cialization, supra note 100; Goodman & Jinks, supra note 34. 
 200. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 104. 
 201. We are simply advised to see an unpublished manuscript held by one 
of the authors. Id. (citing Eric A. Posner & John Yoo, A Theory of Interna-
tional Adjudication (2004) (unpublished manuscript)). 
 202. See id. at 104–06. 
 203. Presumably no executive agency will comply with a treaty against the 
orders of the state’s executive. And since Goldsmith and Posner have from the 
outset announced that leaders’ interests will be a proxy for state interests, it is 
left altogether obscure how compliance ever could diverge from interest, hence 
occasion any agency cost. If, on the other hand, Goldsmith and Posner mean 
here to relax their identification of state interest with leadership interest, then 
we will require some alternative state welfare functional by reference to which 
agency slack and cost-imposition might be rendered intelligible. It is for famil-
iar Arrovian reasons a bit doubtful that such a functional will be forthcoming, 
but until Goldsmith and Posner take at least a stab the phrase “agency cost” 
here will be devoid of content. 
There is also an intriguing irony in the authors’ suggestion here. For Dean 
Koh is not the only author with first-hand knowledge of the internal workings 
of outward-looking bureaucracies. Professor Goldsmith himself has enjoyed 
such access. He has been lauded precisely for correcting rank lawlessness on 
the part of those in charge of whom he was placed. See Posting of Marty Led-
erman to Balkanization, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2005/09/silver-linings-or-
strange-but-true.html (Sept. 21, 2005, 18:08). 
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sis.”204 Again no evidence is offered, nor are we provided any in-
telligible picture of what such a cost-benefit analysis either 
does or would look like—what count as costs, what as benefits, 
how these are commensurated, how probabilities or discount 
rates are derived and applied to alternative long-term outcome 
projections, etc. There is not so much as an interview with a 
“bureaucrat” cited here. 
Finally come “two other points” that “cut against the bu-
reaucratic internalization thesis.”205 “First, there is no reason 
to think that international law compliance will always be the 
top priority for an agency.”206 “Second, and relatedly, different 
bureaucracies with different institutional interests might have 
very different attitudes toward compliance with the same 
treaty.”207 The first “point” is simply unresponsive. The inter-
nalization thesis no more purports to hold universally (or to 
hold that compliance is “the top priority”) than theories of 
childhood norm-internalization and socialization purport to 
hold the existence of sociopaths, crimes, or lesser personal 
shortcomings impossible (or to hold that norm-obedience is al-
ways “the top priority”). The second “point” is unresponsive in a 
manner reminiscent of the first, and in addition ironic. For if 
the authors mean to suggest that it is more often the case that 
agencies diverge in their “interests” in respect of treaties than 
not (which is what they must suggest if they wish to hold the 
internalization thesis more often false than true), then one 
must wonder how states can intelligibly bear interests at all, 
which of course they must if our authors’ alternative, interest-
grounded theory is even to get off of the ground. If divergent 
preferences of diverse agencies cannot be plausibly aggregated, 
can those of the immeasurably more diverse constituencies who 
constitute states? 
2. Applied 
From their theoretical discussion of treaty law Goldsmith 
and Posner turn to two would-be corroborative case studies—
human rights and trade law. It is curious that there are only 
two, particularly given the degree to which we shall see that 
the four proffered models of Part 1 are admitted to break down 
 
 204. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 105. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. 
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in these cases. What proves most interesting, however, is the 
degree to which the studies corroborate the suspicion that arose 
in connection with the treaty law theory as elaborated just 
above: Goldsmith and Posner’s professedly “alternative ac-
count” of treaty law and international law more generally, if it 
generates any empirical predictions at all, does not generate 
any such predictions at variance with those generated by what 
the authors call “traditional” understandings of international 
law. 
Take, for example, the farthest point in the direction of 
generality at which we might have anticipated conflict—the 
question of what actuates state action vis-à-vis other states in 
the first instance. Goldsmith and Posner throughout their book 
have apparently wished us to take them for contradicting a 
traditionalist answer to that question grounded in “normative 
pull,” as putatively contradistinguished from state “self-
interest” pursuit. And indeed, as we observed earlier, the au-
thors must construe state “interest” as excluding normative 
pull if they wish actually to be claiming something that tradi-
tionalists do not.208 
But now consider what our authors observe about human 
rights “preferences”: “people who live in one state care about 
the well-being of coreligionists, coethnics, and conationals liv-
ing in other states, and this concern can translate into govern-
mental interest and action.”209 Moreover, people also might be 
“concerned about the well-being of persons in other states with 
whom they lack ties of religion, ethnicity or citizenship.”210 So it 
seems we are not, after all, to take Goldsmith and Posner for 
disagreeing with those whom they label “traditionalists” on the 
matter of normativity as such, at least not if normativity be 
understood as a conscientious other-regardingness capable of 
coexisting with prudence. 
But in what other sense, then, are we to understand the 
normativity or normative pull with which Goldsmith and Pos-
ner claim to quarrel? Perhaps it has something to do with 
 
 208. See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text. Otherwise we have 
nothing more than Hobbes’s (possibly apocryphal) reconciliation of his pro-
fessed philosophical egoism with being caught giving alms to a beggar (he is 
reported to have said that he remained an egoist who happened to derive sat-
isfaction from giving to others). See AUBREY’S BRIEF LIVES 157 (Oliver Lawson 
Dick ed., 1960). That reply of course renders “egoism,” in the context of the ut-
terance, little more than an ugly word for altruism. 
 209. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 109. 
 210. Id. at 110 (emphasis added). 
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“mak[ing] a fetish” of international law, which Goldsmith and 
Posner remark that liberal states caring about human rights in 
other states do not do.211 It is not clear what the authors mean 
here, but presumably they have in mind the treatment of in-
ternational law as possessed of an authority that is altogether 
independent of its ethical propriety. If so, then with respect to 
their claim as an empirical description of liberal state behavior, 
there appears to be evidence on either side. And no “tradi-
tional” scholar would deny this, since all seem to agree that 
states sometimes, but do not always, comply with their interna-
tional obligations.212 If, on the other hand, the fetishism jibe is 
intended more as a back-handed prescription that the authors 
are recommending for states—e.g., that states teleologically in-
terpret international law pursuant to a vision of some good that 
the law is meant to advance, then I shall find occasion to agree 
with them in Part IV. But again there is no monolithic and con-
tinuing “tradition” that argues consistently against this. 
At the lower level of generality and abstraction that is di-
rect observation of discrete state actions implicating human 
rights norms, Goldsmith and Posner again do not appear actu-
ally to disagree with any named or adequately identified “tradi-
tionalist.” Thus, for example, the only traditionalist interna-
tional law scholars whom the authors name in connection with 
the empirics of human rights treaty accession and compliance 
have found no significant positive correlation between the two 
behaviors.213 That suggests, of course, that traditionalists do 
not “make a fetish” even of human rights treaties in particular, 
let alone international law in general. In so far as one can 
speak of a monolithic “tradition” at all, then, it probably is 
more apt to say that traditionalists view human rights treaties 
not as interval one efficient causes of uniform interval two ef-
fects, but rather as simultaneously consolidating and aspira-
tional agreement-specifying steps in an ongoing process of in-
creasingly exacting and effective global evolution toward 
decency in the treatment of human persons endowed with fun-
damental rights. Such treaties record what has been achieved 
 
 211. Id. at 134. 
 212. A familiar example is Henkin’s oft-quoted adage, “It is probably the 
case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law 
and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.” LOUIS HENKIN, HOW 
NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed. 1979) (emphasis omit-
ted). 
 213. Specifically, Goldsmith and Posner reference Linda Camp Keith and 
Oona Hathaway. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 120–21. 
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in respect of agreement as to what constitutes “the standard of 
civilization,”214 and what we are striving to achieve further in 
the way of living up to that standard. And this is to say that 
there is symbiosis here just as we observed there to be with 
custom, while Goldsmith and Posner’s attachment to static 
analysis occludes vision here as it did there. 
Goldsmith and Posner appear to recognize something like 
this set of observations, not only in Part 3 of the book, to which 
we turn presently, but here in Part 2. For they observe (again 
with admirable candor accompanied by a curious lack of em-
barrassment) that the very constitutive models that structure 
their account hollow out in the case of global human rights.215 
Thus, cooperation and coercion abruptly are noted to be “func-
tionally identical” in the human rights context.216 Cooperation 
itself, in turn, is observed to be both “thin”217 and difficult to 
distinguish from coincidence of interest, since as they have ob-
served earlier, states actually have altogether other-regarding 
and law-regarding interests in the manners in which other 
states treat their own citizens.218 Finally, coordination is found 
to be “thin” as well, since there is so little to coordinate upon 
when the matter at hand concerns not the facilitation of net-
work activity, but the provision of basic rights upon which most 
people seem to agree in principle.219 
Hence, we observe the circumstance in which the entire 
apparatus of one’s theory breaks down in the face of one of the 
but two case studies to which one applies the theory, and in 
which the one point on which the theory to now has professed 
to differ with alternatives—the matter of self-regarding versus 
other- or law-regarding preferences—has effectively been con-
ceded. A natural reaction in this circumstance might have been 
to abandon the proffered theory and commence participation in 
the shared project of pushing global development further along 
in the direction of respect for human rights. It is altogether 
mysterious why the authors have not taken that step. 
 
 
 214. Id. at 128. 
 215. See id. at 111–19 (discussing the coercion, cooperation, and coinci-
dence of interest models in the context of human rights). 
 216. Id. at 118. 
 217. Id. at 115. 
 218. Id. (regarding Helsinki Accords). 
 219. For the one respect in which the authors find that human rights trea-
ties might facilitate coordination, see id. at 130–31. 
HOCKETT_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:32:45 AM 
1766 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1720 
 
Goldsmith and Posner’s treatment of global trade law, like 
that of human rights law, is beset by multiple difficulties. Con-
siderations of space regrettably do not permit plenary discus-
sion, so I shall confine myself to the challenges raised by the 
two principal factors that we have seen challenging Goldsmith 
and Posner on human rights treaties. The authors’ interrelated 
hopes to reduce multilaterality to bilaterality, and to reduce 
normativity to purportedly nonnormative information, again 
lead them into conceptual confusion and error. 
The “logic” of trade-barrier reduction is, according to Gold-
smith and Posner, once again “that of the [bilateral] prisoner’s 
dilemma.”220 Each of two states opens trade in a good produced 
by the other state’s dominant industry, provided that the other 
state behaves symmetrically.221 In this circumstance, the au-
thors recognize, they once again need not rely upon their “other 
explanations of international law—coincidence of interest, co-
ordination, and coercion”—at all.222 The earlier elaboration of 
those models accordingly strikes us once again as puzzling. 
But a more formidable mystery arises here—namely, the 
manifestly multilateral nature of trade treaty development, at 
least since the mid-twentieth century. Goldsmith and Posner at 
first candidly recognize that the multilateral global trade re-
gime, as it has developed since GATT,223 does not vindicate 
their preference for explaining all cooperation as reductively bi-
lateral: “Bilateral trade agreements . . . cannot exploit the en-
tire potential surplus from international trade.”224 To make this 
concession is of course again to abandon a centrally defining 
feature of Goldsmith and Posner’s theory of international law—
that it all can be accounted for via the authors’ four bilateral 
“models.” Perhaps yet again uncomfortable with the apparent 
tension, then, Goldsmith and Posner quickly undertake to take 
back what they have given: several pages later they remind us 
that, since GATT’s nondiscrimination principle is “an effort to 
solve a multilateral prisoner’s dilemma . . . [their] prediction is 
 
 220. Id. at 139. 
 221. Note that state interest is accordingly identified with sectional inter-
est, the empirical plausibility and ethical propriety of which identification is 
dubious to say the least. See infra Part IV. 
 222. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 139.  
 223. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. 
 224. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 145. 
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that it would likely fail.”225 And so it has, they report.226 But 
now note how: “Although states do not explicitly violate the 
rule, they circumvent it easily by creating preferential trading 
areas under Article XXIV, of which there are hundreds.”227 
And what is a preferential trading area (PTA)? It is an-
other multilateral trade regime, the best known of which 
probably are the EU and NAFTA, which is now under consid-
eration for expansion into a full “Free Trade Area of the Ameri-
cas.” And such PTAs, of course, as the authors acknowledge, 
are authorized by the multilateral GATT itself.228  
Goldsmith and Posner’s surprising treatment of trade mul-
tilaterality comes pursuant to a more general “theory of 
GATT.”229 It is in the elaboration of that more general theory 
that we encounter the second problem raised by Goldsmith and 
Posner’s reductionism. The problem stems from yet another at-
tempt to reduce normativity to putatively norm-stripped “in-
formation.” It appears most acutely in the authors’ treatment of 
GATT adjudication. 
“To understand the GATT adjudication system,” Goldsmith 
and Posner announce, we can usefully begin—yet again—“by 
conceiving the trade system as a large number of bilateral rela-
tionships.”230 But since bilateral treating and dispute resolving 
were typical before GATT, the question for a “theory of GATT” 
becomes “[w]hat did the GATT adjudication system add?”231 
Our authors’ initial answer is “[n]othing more than this: it cre-
ated a protocol for requesting a tribunal that would have an in-
stitutional relationship with prior tribunals, including a collec-
tive memory or jurisprudence.”232 But this answer will simply 
beg the question until we are offered an explanation as to why 
“collective memory or jurisprudence” themselves might be 
thought desirable. 
 
 225. Id. at 149 (emphasis added). 
 226. Id. (noting that their “prediction appears to be correct”). 
 227. Id. 
 228. The authors say more, but do not address this peculiarity of their ar-
gument from bilateralism. Nor do they offer an explanation for the authoriza-
tion of PTAs by GATT itself. I think that a better way of looking at the matter 
is my above proposal hypothesizing: more variable functional relations be-
tween changes in the number of players and supposed likelihoods. See supra 
note 115 and accompanying text. 
 229. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 144–58. 
 230. Id. at 153. 
 231. Id. (emphasis added). 
 232. Id. 
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The answer to the “why collective memory?” question, in 
turn, upon which Goldsmith and Posner appear to light without 
quite seeing it as such, is that it affords the basis for neutrality 
on the part of the adjudicator.233 Neutrality in turn affords pro-
cedural capacity to afford “consistent[] divi[sion of] the sur-
plus”234 generated by trade—a desideratum that the authors 
neither explicate nor justify. But at least a weak form of expli-
cation, as well as justification, is obvious, though to state it is 
in effect to repudiate the theory offered by our authors: a more 
or less consistent division of the surplus must be discernible by 
parties over time if the regime is to function and continue. For 
parties tend either to exit, or indeed to engage in forthrightly 
Pareto-damaging behaviors, in response to feelings of indigna-
tion occasioned by “games” that they perceive as systematically 
unfair.235 So fairness from case to case is critical to the regime’s 
perceived legitimacy and continued operation. And multilater-
ality, unsurprisingly—by dint of its association with impartial-
ity and objectivity—plays a critical role in assuring that fair-
ness.236  
Goldsmith and Posner again attempt—it is not clear how 
consciously—to obscure the difficulty posed here by the puz-
zling persistence of normativity. They do so by once again ad-
verting to their characteristic strategy of systematically replac-
ing, in their descriptions, normativity-redolent words with 
more would-be normatively colorless terms sounding in coordi-
nation or information.237 Hence we find, in their attempts to ac-
count for the manifest multilaterality of GATT adjudication as 
 
 233. See id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See, e.g., Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining Experiments, in HANDBOOK OF 
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 253 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995). 
See generally Raymond Fisman et al., Pareto Damaging Behaviors (May 15, 
2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing and introduc-
ing new concepts and a test relating to Pareto-damaging behaviors). The lit-
erature here is vast. A suitable beginning bibliography is found in Roth, supra, 
at 342–48. 
 236. “Unsurprisingly” in view of its resonance with impartiality—
“considering all sides” and “taking no sides” go hand in hand. Note that this 
means that global multilaterality and normativity go hand in hand, which in 
turn explains in part why Goldsmith and Posner are hostile both to normativ-
ity and to multilaterality. It is salutary to recall, in this connection, the weak-
ness of their affirmative argument for bilaterality discussed supra note 115 
and accompanying text.  
 237. Communication and coordination are suffused with normativity. See 
BRANDOM, supra note 194; KRIPKE, supra note 153; LEWIS, supra note 182. 
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such, profuse employment of such locutions as “cooperation,” 
“information,” “focal point,” “higher-quality decisions,” “reputa-
tion for impartiality,” and so on.238 But the cited information 
and coordination afforded by impartial GATT adjudication, of 
course, just is information concerning compliance with, and fa-
cilitating coordination around, a compelling norm—that of fair-
ness. And it is exceedingly obscure what “quality” and “correct-
ness” here could mean without implicit appeal to that norm. 
Similar problems beset Goldsmith and Posner’s discussion 
of “WTO innovations”239—the changes wrought through the 
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations twelve years ago.240 On 
Goldsmith and Posner’s view, if states comply with WTO deci-
sions more enthusiastically than they did with GATT panel de-
cisions, it is “because WTO decisions are better.”241 Indeed. And 
“better” here means fairer still, hence exerting of more “norma-
tive pull.” 
IV.  THE LIMITS DEFENDED—AND SOME 
HOPE RESTORED 
Goldsmith and Posner devote Part 3 of The Limits to what 
they call “external challenges to [their] theory and analyz[ing] 
the theory’s normative implications.”242 The external challenges 
come respectively from those who observe (a) that the theory is 
inconsistent with the rhetorical practices of states; (b) that 
Goldsmith and Posner’s positive account of international law 
simply speaks past that law’s normative claim upon states and 
officials; and (c) that whatever the appropriate positive theory 
or normative content of international law, “states should . . . 
enter treaties and provide aid that would increase global wel-
fare.”243 As for the analysis of the theory’s normative implica-
tions, this proves never forthcoming.244 But Goldsmith and 
 
 238. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 154. 
 239. See id. at 158–60. 
 240. See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (demonstrating 
the effects of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations). 
 241. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 160. 
 242. Id. at 165. 
 243. Id. at 165–66. 
 244. As we shall see, the replies to external challenges prove to be at best 
tenuously, if at all, related to Goldsmith and Posner’s positive theory. And no 
normative implications of the latter ever end up being drawn, let alone ana-
lyzed. At most, then, the arguments in this part of The Limits and those of 
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Posner do nonetheless commit themselves in effect to some 
normative positions, which perhaps are in some way indebted 
to their “positive theory,” in addressing some of the external 
challenges.245 And those positions, I think, can be taken seri-
ously and built upon. 
A. CHEAP LIES, INSULTS, AND SILLINESS: THE LIMITS ON 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IDIOM 
Our authors’ answer to the first external challenge is what 
they call “[a] theory of international rhetoric.”246 This theory 
turns out to be positive rather than normative in character, and 
quite independent of the positive theory elaborated in Parts 1 
and 2. What it appears to be meant to explain is how it can be 
that, though states in fact—per the account of Parts 1 and 2—
act simply to “maximize their [non-other- and non-law-
regarding] interests”247 in their (generally bilateral) interac-
tions with one another, and in so doing establish behavioral 
regularities that merely resemble “laws” of the sort that exert 
“normative pull,” state officials (as well as others, including le-
gal scholars) nevertheless employ the language of “normative 
pull”— i.e., of law and of morals—both in the formal agree-
ments that crystallize, formalize, or codify their preferred be-
havioral regularities and in the justifications that they offer of 
challenged behavior. 
Initially it is obscure why Goldsmith and Posner should 
think there to be any need of a separate account of interna-
tional legal rhetoric. For if their earlier treatments of custom-
ary and treaty law had been successful, there would be nothing 
left to explain. It is central to those earlier accounts, recall, that 
though most of us might think that there is something war-
ranting the word “law” exerting “normative pull” upon states, 
officials and perhaps citizens, there “really” is not. Hence any 
among us who think otherwise simply mistake a sort of shadow 
for the object which has cast the shadow. And if it is true that 
 
Parts 1 and 2 share a penchant for concealing normativity in “information 
speak” and a cognate lack of regard for international legal normativity. But 
the latter, in its nonpositivist stance toward international law, has the effect 
of opening the door to the project of moralizing international law. I take up 
this project in Parts IV.B and IV.C, infra. Goldsmith and Posner, perhaps in-
advertently, supply a helpful springboard into a line of forthrightly normative 
thinking that they do not thus far appear to have countenanced. 
 245. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 167–224. 
 246. Id. at 167. 
 247. See id. at 169. 
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we are deluding ourselves in this way about international legal-
ity, then little mystery remains as to why the language of legal-
ity might be encountered in our discourse about international 
relations. That language is simply the idiomatic correlate of our 
delusion. 
Nevertheless, Goldsmith and Posner now proffer another 
“positive theory.”248 They begin by asking under what condi-
tions states will “talk” at all.249 In a two-state, zero-sum 
game—a situation of “pure conflict”—we are told, any state-
ment made by one state will be assumed by the other to be in-
tended to injure it, so there will be no point in “talking” at 
all.250 Likewise, if relations between states amount to a “posi-
tive-sum” game and there is “full information” on the part of 
each state of the other state’s “characteristics and strategies,” 
talk will “either be rejected as inconsistent with known infor-
mation or ignored as superfluous.”251 So talk will be sensibly 
purposive only in “positive-sum” games with incomplete infor-
mation about “characteristics and strategies.”252 
Noticeably lacking here is a view of “talk” as anything but 
“information conveyance.” It is as though language and linguis-
tic behavior comprised only declarative sentences—“we have 
cats”—and perhaps occasional ejaculations—“ouch”—intended 
either to impart to the recipient something that she did not 
know before or to induce her into thinking that she now knows 
something that is there to be known and was not known before. 
Talk does not figure into, say, “thinking aloud,” or joint think-
ing aloud—shared-purposive interactive communication or de-
liberation geared toward arrival at some suitable, shared un-
derstanding of what is worth jointly pursuing and how to 
pursue it. States might sometimes cooperate (again, observing 
Marquis of Queensbury Rules), but not in thinking or planning, 
or, therefore, in speaking. Here is the discursive counterpart of 
Goldsmith and Posner’s Parts 1 and 2 attachment to statics.253 
 
 
 248. Id. at 172. 
 249. Id.  
 250. Id.  
 251. Id. 
 252. See id. 
 253. The failure to consider “talk” as an ongoing dialogue moving gradually 
to shared ends and means is of a piece with the earlier failure to consider in-
ternational norms as emerging from interest- and ideals-inflected behavior at 
one point, constraining or guiding or informing behavior at another point. See 
supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
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All of this being the case, our authors’ account of interna-
tional rhetoric proceeds straightforwardly as a brief set of sto-
ries in which all that vary are (a) the sorts of “opportunities for 
mutual gain” enjoyed by pairs of states and (b) comparative 
quanta of information possessed by states about each other’s 
“payoffs” and “strategies.”254 So, of course, states often wish to 
enjoy reputations for cooperativeness.255 And it is better to an-
nounce that you are cooperative than to announce that you are 
not, even though talk is cheap to the talker and hence dis-
counted by the listener.256 For “a state that failed to send this 
weak signal would reveal that it belongs to the bad type.”257 
“Coordination games,” in turn, afford yet more obvious payoffs 
to cheap talk.258 Such talk “solves a coordination problem by 
picking out one of multiple equilibria.”259 
Cheap talk also proceeds, on some occasions, with a view to 
nonofficial audiences.260 Pursuant to one model of such talk, 
nonofficial domestic audiences are rationally ignorant relative 
to a foreign-official audience.261 Domestic officials can accord-
ingly have things both ways by (a) making concessions to a for-
eign power that attends more carefully to results than to talk, 
while simultaneously (b) “talking tough” to satisfy domestic 
constituents who attend more to talk than to deeds.262 
The second model of cheap talk for domestic consumption 
is that of offensive speech, which “can commit a leader to a par-
ticular audience by alienating competing audiences.”263 As this 
kind of talk has been abundant in the United States over the 
past fifteen years or so, there is little need to discuss it at 
length. It is curious, however, that both this and the other 
model of cheap talk for domestic consumption come in connec-
 
 254. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 172. 
 255. See id. 
 256. See id. at 174. 
 257. Id. So would-be cooperative states are a bit like birds, frogs, or insects 
out looking for mates. If an animal is searching for a mate and has a decent 
voice and attractive features, and if it is common for animals of the same spe-
cies to flaunt those characteristics, then the animal might as well show them 
off. Otherwise, the animal will be branded as belonging to “the bad type.” 
 258. Id. at 175. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. at 178. 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. We are offered no theory accounting for how it might ever be in a 
state’s interest to concede things to other states while misleading a citizenry 
apparently possessed of contrary preferences. 
 263. Id. at 179. 
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tion with a putative explanation for use by state leaders of law-
redolent discourse in a world in which law is claimed to be 
really endogenous (lacking in normative pull). For most if not 
all of the “tough talk” that we hear—including that cited by 
Goldsmith and Posner—is not suffused with legality at all, but 
rather seems almost to celebrate the defiance of international 
norms.264 
Cheap talk by states intended for foreign nonofficial audi-
ence consumption is, according to Goldsmith and Posner, 
prompted by motives similar to those that actuate talk for other 
audiences.265 It is all about either misleading others or credibly 
showing others that you are on their side by gratuitously alien-
ating their enemies.266 So cheap state-talk is, for the most part, 
a matter of lies and insults. But once again, then, the account 
offered here seems addressed not to international legal talk so 
much as it is simply to readily discounted cheap talk. So we 
still require an explanation of why states’ talk should be suf-
fused with legality, as distinguished from cheapness. How to 
account for that? Well, 
a kind of empty happy talk is common in the international arena just 
as it is in other areas of life; it is largely a ceremonial usage designed 
to enable the speaker to assert policies and goals without overtly ad-
mitting that he or she is acting for a purpose to which others might 
object.267 
But this two-adjective theory of international legalese im-
mediately raises additional puzzles for our twenty-first century 
Messrs. Rochefoucauld:268 First, wouldn’t the years of wran-
gling over particular terms of treaties grow just impossibly te-
dious if it were all just a matter of “empty happy talk”? And 
second, why should a state wish to engage in “empty happy 
talk” simply to avoid overtly admitting that it is acting for an 
objectionable purpose, if there were no real objectionability—
i.e., normativity—at all? Once again, I suggest, it will be more 
intuitively plausible, parsimonious, and empirically explana-
tory here simply to acknowledge the cigar’s being a cigar. Offi-
cials use norm-inflected legal language because there just is, in 
fact, varyingly weak or strong “normative pull”—pull away 
 
 264. Indeed, such contempt for legality often seems to be part of what ren-
ders the talk “tough,” rather than, say, law-cognizantly indignant. 
 265. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 179–80. 
 266. Id. at 180. 
 267. Id.  
 268. If the allusion is found obscure, please see FRANÇOIS DE LA ROCHE-
FOUCAULD, MAXIMS (Leonard Tancock trans., 1967) (1665). 
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from acting for norm-offendingly objectionable purposes. 
Goldsmith and Posner concede this point, in effect, in what 
amounts to their rejoinder to it: they announce that states wish 
to make clear that they do not employ “high discount rate[s]”—
i.e., that states wish to make plain that they do not live for the 
moment or, therefore, lack in a decent respect for the opinions 
of humankind, that they are not “of the bad type.”269 One way 
to do that, of course, would be simply to say that they care 
about the longer-term, rather than simply the short-term po-
litical gains of present officeholders.270 But “[i]n fact,” Gold-
smith and Posner observe, state “practice is more subtle: states 
invoke ideals.”271 “The language of cooperation is the language 
of obligation . . . .”272 But the question, recall, was: why would 
that be? The “more subtle” practice is precisely what we are 
waiting for Goldsmith and Posner to explain away in their 
would-be plenary purge of normativity.273 
Rather than explaining this, Goldsmith and Posner proffer 
an interesting, if unsurprising, conjecture about what the basis 
of obligation to which a state appeals typically will be. Such 
appeals will “occur at the lowest level of abstraction consistent 
with the characteristics of the intended audience.”274 So, for ex-
ample, a fifteenth-century Christian state might appeal to (fif-
teenth-century) Christian values in seeking to persuade an-
other such state of the propriety of some action, while 
appealing instead to Abrahamic religious values in seeking to 
persuade a Muslim state. And so on. 
But now here is where things become interesting—much 
more interesting than our authors appear to appreciate: Gold-
smith and Posner acknowledge that as history proceeds to the 
 
 269. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 181. 
 270. An interesting question would be why existing officeholders would 
ever wish to say any such thing truthfully on behalf of a state and its future 
generations, if those officeholders were to be as self-regarding as the authors 
appear to take states to be. 
 271. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 181. 
 272. Id. at 183. 
 273. Goldsmith and Posner observe at another point that it would be “arti-
ficial” to attempt to avoid speaking in terms of ideals, or at any rate norms, in 
these contexts. Id. at 184. But of course, even if that were true, which is doubt-
ful in view of the ready availability of interest-speak since at least the fifth 
century BCE, the question would be why it would be artificial, why the more 
“natural” mode of speech has come to be the ideal-suffused, and how this could 
ever have come to be absent normative pull. See, e.g., id. at 167. 
 274. Id. at 182. The authors appear to mean not “abstraction,” but “gener-
ality.” 
HOCKETT_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:32:45 AM 
2006] THE LIMITS OF THEIR WORLD 1775 
 
present, it becomes possible and desirable for an ever greater 
number of states to cooperate and communicate.275 And value-
laden communications must accordingly appeal to values that 
are more widely shared—more nearly universal—than those 
shared only by one insular people or cluster of such peoples.276 
So the language of international justification becomes, natu-
rally enough, the language of international (including “transna-
tional”) law and morality.277 But to recognize this, as Goldsmith 
and Posner are right to do, just is to recognize the depth and 
pervasiveness of “normative pull.” 
B. FLICKERING IMBECILE STATES: THE LIMITS ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW’S MORALITY 
Goldsmith and Posner devote the last two chapters of their 
book to what they label two “external challenges” to the account 
of Parts 1 and 2. Here the issue is not how best to explain ap-
parently norm-infused communicative behavior positively, but 
how best to respond normatively to a forthrightly normative set 
of claims. These are the claims that states (a) should obey in-
ternational law, and (b) should engage with other states in 
salutary international lawmaking. If those normative claims 
are correct, then Goldsmith and Posner in Parts 1 and 2, as 
well as in Chapter 6, at best will have done no more than to 
demonstrate the wickedness or fatuity—the dishonesty, offen-
siveness, and/or “empty happy talk[ativity]”—of states and offi-
cials. It will then be open to traditionalists to argue that the 
thing for our authors to do now is to get on board with those 
who urge states’ officials to mend their lawless and hypocritical 
ways. Goldsmith and Posner, I think to their credit, acknowl-
edge this claim and undertake to answer it. The result is, ironi-
cally, the best material in the book—though still, we shall see, 
in need of repair. 
Our authors devote Chapter 7 to answering what they call 
the “assumption . . . that states have a moral obligation to com-
ply with international law.”278 They attack this “assumption” 
from several angles.279 Their first tack is to question whether 
states or other collectivities really can bear moral obligations at 
 
 275. Id. 
 276. See id. 
 277. See id. at 182–83. 
 278. Id. at 185. 
 279. See id. at 185–203. 
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all.280 One might, on the one hand, view collective agents as 
bearing obligations at least in a derivative sense—for example, 
through their serving as proxies for the (somehow) aggregated, 
jointly shared, or distributed obligations of the citizens whose 
agents they are. The problem with predicating state moral obli-
gations on that derivative view, however, according to Gold-
smith and Posner, would be that it leaves international law’s 
moral claim upon states “vulnerable to the births and deaths of 
individuals, migrations, the dissolution and redefinition of 
groups, and ambiguity about the representativeness of political 
institutions. States would flicker, and so would their obliga-
tions to treaties and rules of customary international law.”281 
The alternative to viewing states as agents of individuals 
and derivatively bearing the moral obligations of individuals, 
according to Goldsmith and Posner, is simply to take what we 
might call the fetishist route: it is to view the state itself as an 
object of moral concern, somehow directly bearing moral rights 
and obligations.282 This is “the more common view” according to 
Goldsmith and Posner,283 and “henceforth [will be their] as-
sumption” as well.284 It is, after all, “the assumption of interna-
tional law,” which “purports to bind states, not individuals.”285 
This putative assumption actually is misleading as a mat-
ter of normative sourcing; international lawyers seldom if ever 
have spoken of moral, as distinguished from legal, obligation at 
all.286 The assumption also is outdated (like all the state inter-
est talk in Parts 1 and 2) as a matter of normative subject; for 
as we have now several times noted, the undiluted state-centric 
view of international law is well on the wane. But the assump-
tion proves a convenient one for Goldsmith and Posner to 
make. Once it is made, it becomes trivially easy to question the 
 
 280. Id. at 186–89. 
 281. Id. at 189. 
 282. It is of course equally fetishistic to view the state as directly bearing 
interests. Its interests must be derivative upon its citizens’ interests (not 
merely upon its leaders’ interests), as surely as its ethical obligations and im-
munities must be derivative upon those of its citizens. 
 283. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 187. 
 284. Id. at 189. 
 285. Id.; see also id. at 3–5.  
 286. International law does not purport to hold states directly subject to 
moral obligations, only legal ones. It would certainly be possible, and I suspect 
that it is indeed the inchoate understanding of most international lawyers, to 
think of states as being derivatively owed and owing ethical obligations, which 
obligations in turn find imperfect expression in direct legal obligations. 
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ethical compellingness of international law. For ethics by defi-
nition directly bind only the individuals whom we have now left 
behind in favor of states as the subjects of obligation, at best 
binding states in but the derivative manner that the authors 
have definitionally eschewed. Notwithstanding the unsurpris-
ing ease with which Goldsmith and Posner prove able to cut 
down the strawman that they have thus constructed, however, 
their observations prove interesting in ways that they do not 
appear to have anticipated. 
So, how can states bear moral, as distinguished from legal, 
obligations to comply with international law? Goldsmith and 
Posner inquire.287 “The most common explanation . . . is that 
they have consented to it.”288 But that claim, the authors point 
out, just is not generally true as an empirical matter.289 New 
states are, as it were, born into putative international legal ob-
ligations to which they have not consented.290 And “even old 
states are bound by customary international law that they 
played no role in creating.”291 
On the other hand, our authors acknowledge, states do con-
sent at least to treaties, and “so one might want to argue at 
least that states have a moral obligation to comply with [that 
source of law].”292 Goldsmith and Posner’s reply to this argu-
ment is surprising, in effect simply a retraction of the earlier 
avowal that they will accept the putative premise that states 
are directly rather than derivatively morally obligated by in-
ternational law:293 “a state . . . is not an agent whose well-being 
demands moral consideration.”294 States do not formulate 
Rawlsian “life plans.”295 Nor are they capable of enjoying well-
 
 287. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 185–89. 
 288. Id. at 189. 
 289. Id. at 189–90. 
 290. See id. at 189. 
 291. Id. 
 292. Id. at 190. 
 293. Id. at 189. 
 294. Id. In its context, this observation is a non sequitur. I shall ignore an-
other sense, raised by this and the next several observations, in which Gold-
smith and Posner’s argument might be thought a non sequitur—namely that a 
claim that a corporate entity cannot be the beneficiary of ethical concern does 
not suffice to sustain the claim that it cannot nonetheless be the bearer of 
ethical duty absent some argument for symmetry as between beneficiary and 
bearer status. In most, though assuredly not all cases, I think that such sym-
metry can be established. 
 295. Id. at 191. 
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being or “experienc[ing] welfare or utility”296—even if, per Parts 
1 and 2, they somehow manage to harbor interests. And finally, 
again (repeating their earlier Heraclitean flickering observa-
tion), states cannot bear moral obligations because there is a 
sense in which they do not even exist (save over infinitesimally 
brief intervals): “When a state at time 1 promises that it will 
act in a certain way at time 2, the state at time 1 is committing 
a different entity, the state at time 2, which might be as differ-
ent from the state at time 1 as Mary is from John.”297 
In the context in which it appears, of course, this argument 
is simply a howler. It springs from the most elementary of cate-
gory errors. The commonsense criterion of a state’s identity has 
never been a function of the identities of its citizens at an in-
stant, any more than the criterion of Mary’s or John’s identities 
has ever been a function of the identities of the cells, molecules, 
atoms, electrons, or whatever that can be found along or be-
neath their skins at an instant. Certainly this has never been 
the way in which states have been individuated by interna-
tional law—that set of practices and discourses whose assump-
tions Goldsmith and Posner have announced both at the start 
of their book298 and again for present purposes to be their 
own.299 
The real point, then, of Goldsmith and Posner’s response to 
the state-as-morally-obligated-by-international-law thesis is 
that it is a category error ab initio to attempt to convert states’ 
international legal obligations into anyone’s (or anything’s) 
moral obligations until we have provided some account that re-
lates states back to the only intelligible subjects of moral con-
cern and obligation: individual human beings. (The same, of 
course, both could and should have been said of state interests 
in Parts 1 and 2 of the book. A state can bear interests only to 
the extent that its citizens bear interests, and for a state le-
gitimately to advance interests it must, in its policy determina-
tions, legitimately aggregate those citizens’ legitimate inter-
ests—not simply their or their representatives’ preferences.300) 
 
 296. Id. at 193. 
 297. Id. at 190. 
 298. See id. at 4–5. 
 299. See id. at 189. 
 300. Individuals’ preferences (e.g., those of eugenicists for exterminating 
genetic “bad types”) can also of course be illegitimate. And officials’ prefer-
ences are illegitimate if their preferences do not properly aggregate and reflect 
the citizens’ legitimate preferences. 
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So what Goldsmith and Posner ought to be doing—here, in Part 
3, and throughout their book—is grappling with the problem of 
legitimating the international law that they rightfully decline 
to fetishize, by rendering it both derivable from and answerable 
to a plausible interpersonal ethic.301 
The present review is presumably not the place to attempt 
fully to perform that work of integration. But we can at least 
(a) indicate how easy the work can be in most cases and (b) 
sketch in broad outline the means by which to do it in the few 
hard cases that might be anticipated. Recall first the challenge 
that Goldsmith and Posner appear to think faces the project of 
tying international legal obligation to individual moral obliga-
tion:302 States flicker, in the sense that they are constituted by 
different sets of persons (citizens) at different instants.303 That 
in turn might appear to entail that any attempt to treat states 
as derivatively morally obligated (and protected) by reference 
to their citizenries will involve connecting-lines that are con-
stantly being severed and thus left in need of reconnection. 
How might such reconnecting be done? 
First note, as Goldsmith and Posner appear not to note, 
that many obligations owed to and by individuals inhere inde-
pendently of any particular person’s deeds, characteristics, or 
even existence. Thus, for example, it is morally wrong deliber-
ately to take innocent human life—any innocent human life.304 
That means that innocent human lives are morally protected—
endowed with rights—against such taking, and that anyone 
who acts—either on her own or in concert of one kind or an-
other with others—is morally obligated to refrain from such 
taking. That in turn entails that states, which amount to one 
means by which individuals act in concert and which indeed act 
only through always morally obligated individuals (“offi-
 
 301. It is only in so far as that can be done, I suspect, that states can be 
said in a derivative sense to bear moral obligations to abide by international 
law. 
 302. As noted before, Goldsmith and Posner do not frame the problem this 
way; they frame it as the problem of establishing a moral obligation on the 
part of states to comply with international law. But I have argued that this 
problem is simply an aspect of the more general task of relating state-centered 
legal obligation back to person-centered ethical obligation. 
 303. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 190. 
 304. I do not intend here to exclude reckless or negligent taking of innocent 
life from moral culpability. I simply state here what I take for the easiest case 
for expository purposes. 
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cials”),305 are (derivatively) prohibited from such life-taking. 
These obligations obtain irrespective of any states’ “Johns” or 
“Marys” at any given instant. Nothing here “flickers” in any 
relevant sense, and there is accordingly no difficulty in finding 
a moral, as well as a legal, obligation not to act inconsistently 
with any international legal rule that “codifies” the moral prin-
ciple. 
The more such principles that we identify (e.g., every hu-
man adult enjoys a right to equal political voice, every human 
child enjoys a right to equal long-term economic opportunity, 
etc.) the more the putative “problem” of connecting person-
centered ethics to state-centered international law recedes. It 
becomes straightforward, in principle, to relate international 
law back to, and to imbue it with, basic human decency, hence 
to lend it legitimate normative pull—the sort of pull which, 
when ignored, occasions our appropriate disgust and sanc-
tion.306 I think that there are many such principles with which 
to imbue international law. 
Next, consider ethical obligations that do arise by dint of 
particular individuals’ characteristics. Many believe, for exam-
ple, that persons born with certain handicaps, diseases, and 
other disadvantages through no fault of their own are owed 
special solicitude by others who are not thus disadvantaged—
particularly, perhaps, by those who are blessed, owing to no 
particular virtuous or value-adding actions that they under-
take, with equal and opposite advantages, so to speak. In this 
case, there will indeed occur some flickering among states over 
time: in one decade one state might include more very disad-
vantaged than very advantaged citizens, while another state is 
oppositely situated; and in another decade, these states’ rela-
tive compositions might be reversed. 
But now note that flickering here presents no special chal-
lenge to the project of connecting international law to interper-
sonal ethics. Were we to construct some form of international 
social insurance arrangement analogous to those found in 
many societies, for example, nothing in principle would prevent 
our arranging for states with disproportionately well-endowed 
citizens to transfer assistance funds to states with dispropor-
 
 305. That is, Nuremburg defenses (“I was only doing my job as a Nazi offi-
cial”) are ethically excluded. 
 306. To the degree that we refrain from suffusing international law with 
such decency even when we are able, I am as pleased as Goldsmith and Posner 
to deny, or at any rate to discount, its moral compellingness. 
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tionately under endowed citizens. And both the directions of 
transfer and the amounts transferred could flicker more or less 
in tandem with the states’ handicapped populations over 
time.307 The international legal norms which constituted that 
arrangement would be in harmony with the ordinary human 
morality that counsels this form of mutual assistance. 
Finally, consider the one class of cases for which flickering 
might, in some cases, look to present the project of harmonizing 
international law and human decency with a challenge: cases 
in which obligations and protections arise not by dint of human 
beings’ bearing fundamental rights, or by dint of their bearing 
certain characteristics for which they are not responsible, but 
cases in which obligations and protections are indeed tied to or 
modulated by characteristics, or deeds, for which persons are 
responsible.308 The first thing to note here is that even in this 
class, the fact of flickering will seldom amount to a problem. 
We can draw this point out most effectively by partitioning the 
class into subclasses. 
First, in cases where the only moral significance of actions 
for which individuals are responsible is to nullify or attenuate 
the moral claims that they could otherwise make upon others 
(e.g., by rendering them no longer innocent per our first earlier 
 
 307. I abstract for present purposes from such matters as state policies 
that affect citizens’ health endowments (for example pollution and population 
policies), which policies presumably would have to be addressed by any actual 
global social insurance contract. Again, the point here is to keep the example 
as simple as possible for purposes of schematizing yet another class of cases in 
which flickering, even while now relevant to the project of moralizing interna-
tional law (because it determines the magnitude and flow of possible moral 
obligations between states), does not obstruct that project. I have discussed 
one possible form of international social insurance. See, e.g., Robert Hockett, 
Just Insurance Through Global Macro-Hedging: Information, Distributive Eq-
uity, Efficiency and New Markets for Systemic-Income-Risk-Pricing and Sys-
temic-Income-Risk-Trading in a “New Economy,” 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 
107 (2004); see also Robert Hockett, From “Mission-Creep” to Gestalt-Switch: 
Justice, Finance, the IFI’s, and the Intended Beneficiaries of Globalization, 98 
AM. SOC. INT’L L. PROC. 69, 71–75 (2004) [hereinafter Hockett, From “Mission-
Creep” to Gestalt-Switch]); Robert Hockett, Three (Potential) Pillars of Trans-
national Economic Justice: The Bretton Woods Institutions as Guarantors of 
Global Equal Treatment and Market Completion, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 93, 95–
105 (2005) [hereinafter Hockett, Pillars of Transnational Economic Justice]; 
Robert Hockett, Whose Ownership? Which Society?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 101, 
185–200 (2005) [hereinafter Hockett, Whose Ownership?]. 
 308. In this class, I think, the relevant characteristics will themselves be in 
critical measure the products of deeds. So, for example, if one behaves vio-
lently and does so repeatedly, one accordingly becomes more prone to violence 
as habits of restraint diminish. 
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class of cases, or no longer faultlessly handicapped or under-
endowed per our second earlier class of cases), flickering will be 
no more problematic (or even pertinent) here than it was in 
those cases. 
Second, take the subclass of cases in which actions or char-
acteristics for which individuals are in some sense responsible 
do render flickering potentially germane. This subclass seems 
to involve only two kinds of obligation: the contract-like kind 
that arises from a particular kind of promising behavior, and 
the tort-like kind that arises from a particular kind of illegiti-
mate cost-occasioning or cost-externalizing behavior:309 The in-
dividuals who constitute state A at time 1 (t1) collectively prom-
ise the individuals who constitute state B at that time to 
perform or refrain from, at time 2 (t2), some course of action of a 
particular type—namely, the type that is not antecedently re-
quired or prohibited by ethical principles binding upon all 
agents irrespective of their consent:310 contract. Or, the former 
individuals collectively engage in some form of behavior that 
violates such an antecedent requirement: tort. Under what cir-
cumstances will the new state A at t2, though legally bound ac-
cording either to the international legal principle pacta sunt 
servanda or to the principle of respect for state integrity, be 
morally bound (in a manner derivative of its citizens’ moral ob-
ligations) to perform or refrain or to compensate?  
The question is not difficult to answer. First note that, at 
least in the case of sufficiently large and democratic states in 
which substantial majorities have agreed either directly to the 
promise or action itself, or to be represented by those who have 
promised or acted on their behalves, it will seem more appro-
priate to flip the question: we should ask instead under what 
circumstances the new state A at t2 might not be morally 
bound. For in such cases, there will not be flickering in respect 
 
 309. Illegitimacy—indeed, the concept of ethically salient externalization 
itself—of course rides here upon a conception of justice, an account of the ap-
propriate baseline distribution of costs. To impose an “externality” is to force 
another to bear one’s own just allotment of burdens. The standard Kaldor-
Hicksian understanding of externality as occasioning a falling short of an oth-
erwise attainable social aggregate of wealth is ethically uninteresting. See, 
e.g., Hockett, From “Mission-Creep” to Gestalt-Switch, supra note 307, at 71; 
Hockett, Pillars of Transnational Economic Justice, supra note 307, at 95–105; 
Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 307, at 150–53. 
 310. The qualifier is critical. In its absence, the antecedently required acts 
belong in one or the other of the earlier, considered classes one and two, and 
the promise itself is accordingly irrelevant. 
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of the agreement or action in question so much as there will be 
a gradual, low-amplitude, molasses-like potential for changed 
aggregate state attitude toward the agreement or action. And 
in that case, it will seem appropriate to demand of the claimant 
of changed state attitude that she or he point to some reason to 
expect the probability of an aggregate “yes” vote at t2 to depart 
from the actual frequency (over the voting population) of the 
“yes” vote at t1. 
Next, note that the most reasonable answer to our new 
flipped question would seem to be: (a) for contract-like and tort-
like cases alike, when state A at t1 is undemocratic; (b) for con-
tract-like cases alone, when circumstances (apart from the atti-
tudes of state A’s citizens)311 upon which the agreement was 
predicated have changed in a manner not anticipated by the 
parties or contemplated in the agreement; perhaps (c) for con-
tract-like and tort-like cases, and generally for shorter inter-
vals 2–1, when only a very slim majority in a democratic state 
A at t1 has (directly or via representatives) approved the 
agreement or action and things turn around by t2; or, perhaps 
(d) generally for lengthier intervals 2–1, when the population of 
A by t2 has indeed substantially turned over relative to t1 and 
does not consent to the agreement or ratify the action.312 
Now consider whether the problematicity that would afflict 
an attempt to hold state A morally obligated at t2 under cir-
cumstances (a) through (d) need afflict the international legal 
system’s treatment of the state’s obligations under such cir-
cumstances: case (b), of course, already is accommodated under 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in a manner 
analogous to that in which its private law counterpart typically 
is treated in domestic contract doctrines.313 Case (a), for its 
part, appears to be coverable by the now rapidly developing in-
ternational norm in favor of democratic governance.314 It seems 
straightforward enough, as a legal matter, either to hold un-
democratic leaders accountable for breach of treaties that they 
undertake and that their subsequently democratic states de-
 
 311. The reason for this parenthetical will be plain after cases (c) and (d) 
are characterized. 
 312. I explain the reason for the “perhaps” in connection with cases (c) and 
(d) after the next paragraph. 
 313. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 185, at 
339–41. 
 314. See, e.g., DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra 
note 97 (offering an excellent collection of scholarly interpretations of democ-
ratic governance). 
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nounce, or to hold states that treat with undemocratic regimes 
estopped from laying claims against those regimes’ democratic 
successors, or both.315 
Cases (c) and (d) are only a bit more difficult. In (c), the 
state is readily analogized to a mental incompetent or schizo-
phrenic. Neither common morality nor domestic law in contem-
porary societies holds such persons responsible. And both hold 
those who would enter into binding agreements with such un-
fortunate persons to do so at their voluntarily undertaken peril, 
while holding those who are tortiously injured by such persons 
to be the least inappropriate bearers of risk of such injury ab-
sent either insurance or some other party charged with the re-
sponsibility of controlling the incompetent. It would not be a 
stretch for international law to hold likewise.316 
Case (d), for its part, is readily analogized to case (b), and 
it would not appear too much to develop international law in 
such manner as to accommodate it. In both of these last two 
cases, moreover, the problem would not seem likely to afflict 
most treaties or actions, only those comparatively few in re-
spect of which majority approval has been very slight and/or 
weak. So yet again, even in the very small subclass of cases in 
which states’ flickering populational identities can even be so 
much as implicated by the project of moralizing international 
law, that flickering does not appear to amount to a significant 
or likely to be oft-encountered impediment. 
I think that the law-moralizing project that I have just sug-
gested also can be brought to bear in assessing Goldsmith and 
Posner’s final consideration in Chapter 7—that of “Morality 
and International Legal Change.”317 The extension is straight-
forward, so I leave it to one side in consideration of space con-
straints.  
 
 315. Surely this would amount to appropriate adoption of a “general prin-
ciple[ ] of law” per Article 38(1)(c) of the International Court of Justice Statute. 
See ICJ Statute, supra note 86, art. 38, para. 1. This is a source of interna-
tional law, recall, that is ignored by our authors. It might also counsel institut-
ing another form of global insurance. 
 316. Again, this would amount to a “general principle[ ] of law,” per Article 
38(1)(c) of the International Court of Justice Statute. See ICJ Statute, supra 
note 86, art. 38, para. 1.  
 317. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 4, at 197 (emphasis added). 
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C. STATE IMBECILITY REDUX: THE LIMITS ON INTERNATIONAL 
ENGAGEMENT’S MORALITY 
While Goldsmith and Posner’s Chapter 7 purports to “ana-
lyze[] a state’s moral duty to comply with international law,” 
their final chapter is devoted to “analyz[ing] the state’s moral 
duty to enter into treaties and to take other related forms of in-
ternational action in the first place.”318 At first, it appears that 
Goldsmith and Posner will once again argue against 
“[m]ainstream international law” scholars, who they say “con-
tend[] that states . . . should be more other-regarding.”319 But it 
quickly grows apparent that our authors’ real interlocutors in 
this chapter will be certain contributors to “the philosophical 
literature”—evidently because, in contrast to the international 
legal literature, the philosophic “examines or defends the as-
cription of strong cosmopolitan duties to the United States and 
other liberal democracies.”320 
The thrust of Goldsmith and Posner’s argument against 
the cosmopolitan philosophers is an attempt to level at them, as 
a group, an analogue to the argument that Goldsmith and Pos-
ner tell us some of them level at others of them. Cosmopolitans, 
our authors report, “seek[] to enhance attachments and duties 
to the community of all human beings, regardless of national or 
local affiliation,” on the ground that “every human being’s life 
is equally valuable, regardless of group or national member-
ship.”321 But that desideratum as thus stated leaves unspecified 
the principal bearer(s) of “cosmopolitan duty.” So, for example, 
we may ask whether it is better-off individuals who owe such 
duties, institutions that owe them, or both.322 
“Institutionalist cosmopolitans,” Goldsmith and Posner ob-
serve, unsurprisingly take institutions for the primary cosmo-
politan duty-bearers, owing to the presence of certain limita-
tions that constrain individual action.323 “[I]nstitutions are 
better at collecting and processing information,”324 “they have 
‘power’ and efficacy and thus ‘can alter mass behavior,’”325 and 
 
 318. Id. at 205. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. at 206. 
 321. Id. 
 322. See id. at 207. In the latter case, of course, we will often ask the fol-
low-up question, “Which institutions?” 
 323. See id. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Id. (quoting Michael J. Green, Institutional Responsibility for Global 
HOCKETT_3FMT 06/12/2006 08:32:45 AM 
1786 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [90:1720 
 
“they can better spread the costs of action.”326 Human persons, 
by contrast, face biological and psychological limits, require 
“space . . . to flourish without regard to the demands of moral-
ity,” face “severe collective action hurdles,” and “cannot be ex-
pected to comply with obligations that are so strong that others 
will not do their fair share.”327 
Our authors argue that limitations “akin to the biological, 
moral, and psychological” constraints upon individual action 
likewise limit the plausible ascribability of “strong cosmopoli-
tan duties to liberal democratic governments.”328 So, first, 
Goldsmith and Posner explain, states are “large[]” and “di-
verse,” and “members of [such] pluralistic societies vary signifi-
cantly in their commitments to charity.”329 Moreover, “[e]ven 
strongly cosmopolitan-minded citizens can differ sharply about 
the appropriate focus of cosmopolitan charity”—supporters of 
Israel and supporters of the Palestinians, for example, poten-
tially “cancel one another out.”330 Second, “the state does not 
organize itself for the purpose of engaging in acts of cosmopoli-
tan charity.”331 Third, “solidarity and altruism depend to some 
degree on (physical, cultural, or familial) proximity.”332 
At first blush, this might all ring quite plausible in a folksy 
sort of way. “Charity begins at home,” after all, and only heroes 
devote their full lives to the poor and the suffering even at 
home, let alone elsewhere. We can’t all be saints, can we? But a 
little more thought quickly exposes the remarkable battery of 
interrelated confusions and illicit slides that jointly constitute 
our authors’ argument here. 
First, while it is commonsensical enough to suggest that 
“can” limits “should,”333 “can” easily limits “should” rather less, 
if at all. It has never been a metaethical attribute of ethical ob-
ligations that they be dischargeable effortlessly. Ethics would 
be pointless in the absence of demands. 
But now in this connection note, second, that Goldsmith 
and Posner speak exclusively (and indeed surprisingly) in 
 
Problems, 30 PHIL. TOPICS 79, 85–86 (2002)). 
 326. Id. 
 327. Id. at 208. 
 328. Id. at 209. 
 329. Id. at 210–11. 
 330. Id. at 211. 
 331. Id.  
 332. Id. at 212. 
 333. Id. at 219. 
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terms of supererogatory moral concepts such as “charity,” 
sometimes “solidarity,” or “altruism,” as if those they label 
“cosmopolitans” were advocating simply that states behave as 
Mr. Rogers, Rin Tin Tin, or Mother Theresa. That covertly and 
quite falsely tars cosmopolitans with the brush of implausibil-
ity—as if they were advocating nonobligatory heroism of the 
sort that might engage the “ought”-limited-by-“can” concern. 
And of course it stacks the deck in favor of our authors’ argu-
ment for reining in our expectations, since heroism would in-
deed be rather more to ask of agents than is decency. But 
global ethicists do not typically argue from supererogatory 
charity or saintly heroism. (Neither, of course, do supporters of 
Israel or of Palestinian Arabs.) They draw attention instead to 
obligatory justice—to basic human rights as distinguished from 
importuned favors or warm, fuzzy feelings. That, in turn, de-
prives Goldsmith and Posner’s “limits of charity” argument of 
all traction; the clutch simply never engages. 
Our authors might reply that it will nonetheless be diffi-
cult to induce democratic states into doing justice, like charity, 
to foreigners if their constituents do not care about justice or 
foreigners. But this takes us, via the observation just above 
about easy “can’s” not limiting “ought,” to yet another trouble 
with Goldsmith and Posner’s line of argument: this is the mat-
ter of the cosmopolitans’ audience. Few if any global justice ad-
vocates urge that states, any more than individuals, simply 
work unilaterally—and again, therefore, heroically—to right all 
the wrongs of the world.334 Even less do they urge that states 
act in such manner in deliberate disregard of citizens’ purport-
edly static exogenous “preferences” to the contrary. Rather, ad-
vocates of a more just world order argue in favor of joint action 
by all states, and by individuals and intermediating institu-
tions within states—according to what forms of beneficial 
change each is best situated to effect—to conceive, design, and 
gradually develop institutional arrangements more in keeping 
 
 334. The only such of whom I know are utilitarians, perhaps most notably 
Peter Singer—ironically, the principal ethicist of globalization cited by Gold-
smith and Posner. But it is not accurate to label utilitarians or any other 
maximizers as “justice advocates.” See Hockett, From “Mission-Creep” to Ge-
stalt-Switch, supra note 307; Hockett, Pillars of Transnational Economic Jus-
tice, supra note 307; Hockett, Whose Ownership?, supra note 307. It is much 
easier to discredit (and argue for “flourishing space” against) aggregationists—
who are both fetishist and, often, heroism demanding—than it is to discredit 
those who advocate equal opportunity, or a decent starting gate, or resource 
minimum for all. 
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with an ethic of equal worth among all human beings than are 
the arrangements we currently find.335 The former are ar-
rangements that will afford something closer to equal protec-
tion against basic rights violations, and equal opportunity to 
build worthwhile lives through the exercise of responsible 
value-adding effort, to all of the world’s inhabitants than do 
current arrangements. They also, presumably, are arrange-
ments that will facilitate cooperative action that is geared to-
ward that end, as well as joint deliberation over time—not sim-
ply “information conveyance”—about means toward that end. 
Such deliberation not only will produce better and more 
broadly acceptable ideas about such means, but also will facili-
tate more widespread appreciation of the compellingness of the 
ends themselves.336 
Such weaknesses as might inhere in this advocacy inhere 
only in the want thus far, I believe, of (a) a well-articulated, 
psychologically, social-scientifically, and institutionally in-
formed “blueprint” for such arrangements, and (b) an adequate 
menu of alternative sequenced plans of implementation. This is 
the task that lies ahead for us all if we would live and flourish 
together on a shrinking, warming, and worryingly weaponized 
planet. It is a task that will have to involve lawyers, psycholo-
gists, social scientists, and ethicists alike, as found among the 
world’s citizenries at large, in governments, in NGOs, and in 
the academy. For ethicists are particularly adept at uncovering 
the justice-significance of particular consequences likely to be 
wrought by particular social and institutional relations. The so-
cial scientists are likewise adept in respect of determining what 
alternative institutional and social arrangements are likely in 
macro to be attainable, and to yield what consequences; while 
the lawyers and psychologists can best tell us how, more in mi-
cro, institutions, their personnel and the people they affect, in 
addition to institutional “path dependence,” actually operate 
and constrain feasible choice. People with these complementary 
understandings must actually talk to one another about the 
 
 335. Again, bettering process, not Scrooge-state statics. 
 336. The role of deliberation in salutarily melding endogenous preferences 
themselves is well considered. See, e.g., CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1996); see also DELIBERATIVE DEMOC-
RACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Harold Hongju Koh & Ronald C. Slye eds., 1999) 
(collecting essays inspired by Nino). There is a much larger literature on de-
liberation and endogenous preferences, of course, in particular the work of 
Fishkin, Gutman, Habermas, and Sunstein, but in the interest of space I con-
fine myself here to but dropping the names. 
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project at hand, all the way through. It is a matter of symbiosis 
right from the beginning—from conceiving, to planning, to im-
plementing. Goldsmith and Posner, who appear to have at least 
some grounding in more than one of the requisite disciplines, 
are well-situated to contribute to this critical effort instead of 
effectively championing complacency with stale and statics-
stuck “models” tautologously “modeling” and thereby legitimat-
ing mere Scrooges writ large. What is preventing them? Cer-
tainly nothing, least of all the claims made in this book, pre-
vents us. 
CONCLUSION 
We have covered much ground here, maybe too much, in 
what might have amounted to overmuch detail. But The Limits 
will surely elicit much heated debate, and it seems fitting that 
at least one review consider the book both on its own terms and 
in plenary fashion. The book also, I think, in a particularly 
helpful way sums up much that was wrong in old-style state-
fetishism, undefined interest-appeal, and ultimately corrupting 
power-celebration—wrong conceptually, wrong empirically, and 
wrong ethically. It thus affords fitting occasion for wholesale 
autopsy, then final interment, of that moribund tradition—as 
well as, symmetrically, for point-for-point notice of the more 
hopeful developments that now gather over its grave. 
It just will not do, in this time and place, to pretend that 
anything of a transnational nature is explained when actions 
are said to proceed from the rational choices of unanalyzed 
states seeking to maximize decency-indifferent and otherwise 
undefined interests. Much less will it do, then, to pretend that 
any “limits” on what people of good will, acting in concert 
through states and through other institutions, can accomplish 
might be limned by any such putatively positive account. We 
should make no mistake here: Goldsmith and Posner to this 
point are choosing their limits, as well as their warrantless sto-
ries of others as limited—or warped—in the ways they purport 
to describe. That choice is not just ill-prompted, ill-conceived, 
ill-informed, and ill-justified; it is just ill, and in need of real 
cure. 
I wish, then, to end with a proposal I think better 
prompted, conceived, informed, and justified than the book I 
have been reviewing. Let all of us, including Goldsmith, Posner, 
and others blessed with their gifts, set ourselves to the task of 
moving ahead toward a world justly governed, under the rule of 
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just law. Let us think through what that will require be con-
ferred upon, and expected of, the world’s inhabitants. Let us 
also inquire, in constructive spirit, what we must do to get 
there. Let us ask what limits really constrain or direct us, and 
what limits now can be pushed; hence, what requirements of 
justice are presently attainable and in what degree, in view of 
the complex and fine-grained natures of well-meaning persons, 
institutions, and societies, and of the ways in which these na-
tures develop through self-conscious, self-constructive, and self-
amending effort. And as we do this, let us engage in those acts 
of construction and reconstruction themselves, which actions 
are underway even as we purport to be “merely describing” 
human affairs, and which actions accordingly can further in-
form our theorizing itself—even as they edge us all the while 
closer to the goal that both prompts and lends meaning to our 
efforts. 
